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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 980189-CA
Priority No. 2

JOHN LELEAE,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following are set forth in full in Addendum A:
U.S. Const, amend XIV, § 1
Utah Const, art. I, § 7
Utah Const, art. I, § 12
Utah Const, art. I, § 13
Utah Const, art. I, § 24
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (Supp. 1998)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (Supp. 1998)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (Supp. 1998)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1995)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995)
U.R.E. 106
U.R.E. 611(a)
U.R.Cr.P. 18
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW,
AND PRESERVATION BELOW
1.

Whether

the

evidence

concerning

the

element

of

"serious bodily injury" is sufficient to sustain the conviction for
second degree felony aggravated assault.
Standard of review.

A jury verdict is reviewed viewing

"the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a
light most favorable to the verdict."

State v. Seale, 853 P. 2d

862, 865 (Utah), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 865, 114 S.Ct. 186, 126

L.Ed.2d

145

(1993).

It is appellant's burden to marshal

evidence supporting the verdict.

the

State v. Strain, 885 P. 2d 810,

819 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Pilling, 875 P.2d 604, 607-8 (Utah
App. 1994).

A jury verdict is reversed only if "'the evidence

. . . is [so] sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted.'"
State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 332

(Utah 1991)

Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)).

(quoting State v.

Accord State v. Barlow,

851 P.2d 1191, 1193 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah
1993) .
Preserved below by motion to dismiss at R. 3 79:73-75; see
also R.45-49 (pretrial memorandum).
2.

Whether errors in jury voir dire deprived Mr. Leleae

of a fair trial.
Standard of Review.
We review defendant's challenge to the trial
court's voir dire for an abuse of discretion. Barrett v.
Peterson, 868 P. 2d 96, 98 (Utah App. 1993) . Although the
trial court is afforded broad discretion during voir
dire, the " 'discretion must be exercised in favor of
allowing discovery of biases or prejudice in prospective
jurors.' " Id. (quoting State v. Hall, 797 P.2d 470, 472
(Utah App.), cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990)).
We will not disturb "a trial court's discretionary
rejection of voir dire questions" unless the trial court
abused its discretion and the abuse " 'rose to the level
of reversible error.'" Id. (quoting Hall, 797 P. 2d at
472) . Reversible error occurs when, after reviewing the
totality of the questioning, we conclude that trial
counsel was not given "'"an adequate opportunity to gain
the information necessary to evaluate jurors."'"
Id.
(quoting Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460, 462 (Utah
App.1991), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992)
(quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P. 2d 439, 448 (Utah
1988))) .
2

State v. Viail, 922 P.2d 15, 25 (Utah App. 1996).
Preserved below at R. 378:74-6, 401A:252-3.
3.

Whether

the

trial

court

erred

in

allowing

the

prosecution to admit a misleading limited portion of Mr. Leleae's
statement,

while

precluding

the

defense

from

having

related

portions that were necessary to put the statement in proper context
admitted at that time.
Standard of review. The applicability of a legal rule to
a given fact pattern is reviewed for "correctness," with some level
of discretion accorded the trial court along a spectrum ranging
from "de novo" to "broad discretion."
935-9

(Utah 1994) .

State v. Pena, 869 P. 2d 932,

The amount of discretion to be accorded in

review of a rule of completeness claim has not yet been decided.
This court should exercise close review.
three

criteria

that

are

useful

in

deciding

Pena discussed

whether

broader

discretion should be accorded the trial court:
(i) when the facts to which the legal rule is to be
applied are so complex and varying that no rule
adequately addressing the relevance of all these facts
can be spelled out; (ii) when the situation to which the
legal principle is to be applied is sufficiently new to
the courts that appellate judges are unable to anticipate
and articulate definitively what factors should be
outcome determinative; and (iii) when the trial judge
has observed "facts," such as a witness's appearance and
demeanor, relevant to the application of the law that
cannot be adequately reflected in the record available to
appellate courts.
Pena,

869

P. 2d at

completeness

939.

In all

for recorded

forward and undisputed.

cases

involving

statements, the

the

facts are

rule of

straight-

The second criterion likewise militates

for close review, as the rule of completeness is hardly new.
3

E.g.

United States v. Carver, 164 U.S. 694, 697 (1897) ("where the whole
or part of a conversation has been put in evidence by one party,
the other party is entitled to explain, vary, or contradict it").
Finally, demeanor is not at issue and the record is fully adequate
for review.

All three criteria suggest close review is warranted.

This Court should afford little or no discretion, conducting a "de
novo" review.
Preserved below at R. 379:2-7 (in limine argument).

The

State introduced the misleading statement at R. 379:39-40.

Mr.

Leleae's statement is contained in the record at R. 4 02.

The

portion at issue here, pages 402:30-31, is
4.

attached as addendum B.

Whether the gang enhancement, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-

203.1, is unconstitutional?
Standard
constitutional
correctness.

of

review.

construction

are

Questions

of

issues

law

of

statutory

and

reviewed

for

State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993),

State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 1991).
Preserved below at R. 256-297 (Motion); 369-73 (Order,
attached as addendum G ) .
5.

Whether the trial court erred in failing to give Mr.

Leleae the benefit of a less severe 0-5 year sentence in lieu of a
gang-enhanced minimum term of 6 years under the Shondel doctrine.
Standard of review.

"Our review under the Shondel rule

'focuses on the trial court's legal conclusions, which we review
under

a

correction-of-error

standard,

deference to the trial court's ruling.'"
4

according

no

particular

State v. Kent, 945 P.2d

145, 146 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting State v. Vocrt. 824 P.2d 455, 456
(Utah App. 1991)).
Preserved below at R. 288-293.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Appellant John Leleae and codefendants Edwin and Viliamu
Seumanu were charged by information with attempted homicide, or in
the alternative second degree felony aggravated assault.
(information),

207

(information

instruction).

The

R. 7-11

trial

court

granted Mr. Leleae' s motion to sever his trial from that of his
codefendants.

R. 106.

Trial was held November 25 and 26, 1997.

See transcripts, R. 378

(11/25/97) , 401A (in chambers voir dire

which occurs chronologically at 378:60), 379 (11/26/97), and 381
(partial
379:131).
assault.

11/26/97

transcript

which

occurs

chronologically

at

The jury returned a verdict of guilty of aggravated
R. 206, 379:177.

Mr. Leleae was sentenced to a gang-

enhanced prison term of 6 to 15 years.

R. 351-2.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 10, 1997 Kenny Brems was driving his "decked out"
1977 Ford pickup with camper shell eastbound on 3500 South just
past 4800 West at about 9:45 P.M. on Saturday, May 10, 1997.

R.

378:93, --96. He noticed a blue Monte Carlo in the right lane.

R.

3 78:97.

R.

378:97-8.

He was listening to music and heard two "pops."

He turned down his radio, and in the vicinity of 4400

West he heard another pop and his rear window shattered.
378:98.

R.

As a result of construction, the normally four lane road

was constricted down to two, with the eastbound traffic moving into
5

the westbound lanes.
noise was a gunshot.

R. 378:98-9.

Mr. Brems realized that the

R. 3 78:102.

The road was widening back into four lanes.

Mr. Brems

did not want the car behind him to be able to pull alongside, so he
backed into it.

R. 378:102-3.

into another car.

The Monte Carlo was pushed back

R. 378:103-4.

Mr. Brem's truck stalled, so he

got out and noticed people in the Monte Carlo getting out of their
car with a gun.
shirt.

R. 3 78:104.

One was wearing shorts and a flannel

R. 378:113.1 Mr. Brems identified Mr. Leleae as the person

who got out with a gun.

R. 378:114. Mr. Brems ran down 3500 South

in front of the westbound traffic, trying to get a car to stop and
help, and succeeded in getting a motorist to call the police.

R.

378:104-5.
As Mr. Brems was standing by the stopped motorist, the
Monte Carlo pulled around his truck, ran over some barricades, and
struck Mr. Brems in the thigh.
378:106-7.

He was knocked to the ground.

R.

Someone got out of the Monte Carlo and asked why Mr.

Brems had backed into their car, and he responded, "because you
were shooting at me." A second person from the Monte Carlo arrived
and began hitting Mr. Brems.
begging

He "pretty much covered up and kept

for my life at that point."

R. 378:107.

Mr. Brems

remembers a woman trying to get the attackers to stop.

R. 3 78:108.

He recalls seeing the plaid flannel shirt again, but could not tell
if the person wearing the plaid shirt was hitting him or not.
x

"By

Mr. Leleae was wearing a plaid flannel shirt at the time of
his arrest, although he was not wearing shorts. See Def. Ex. 1, 3,
State Ex. 23.
6

that time I was getting hit so much that I couldn't tell which one
was hitting me and which one wasn't . . . "

R. 378:115.

Mr. Brems

could not say that Mr. Leleae ever hit him.

R. 3 78:138.

Mr. Brems

believes someone else was trying to help him:
[I]t seemed like one would get a chance to throw a couple
of punches at me and someone would grab him and another
would come in. So it was kind of a pull-one-off, one
jumped on, pull-one-off, another. A rotation type of
thing . . .
R.

378:146-7.

Mr. Brems

identified

the persons

Exhibits 24 and 25 as the individuals who beat him up.

pictured

in

R. 378:148.

Mr. Brems received minor head injuries and a broken jaw.
He was treated at Pioneer Hospital, and had surgery on his jaw the
following Monday at St. Marks Hospital.

R. 378:108.

His jaw was

wired shut for about a month and a half.

R. 378:110. To assist in

eating, a tooth or bridge was temporarily removed to allow space
for a straw.

R. 378:109.

378:109-10.

After

necessary.

the

R. 378:110.

That tooth or bridge is back now.
jaw was unwired,

no

further

care

R.
was

His jaw has fully recovered, except that

Mr. Brems finds it painful to hold a flashlight in his teeth the
way he did formerly.

R. 378:110, --141, --142.

Mr. Brems lost 20

pounds while his jaw was wired shut, but at the time of trial, six
and a half months after the assault, had gained back all but five
pounds.

R. 378:110-11.
Kevin Lubbers was driving the vehicle that the Monte

Carlo was pushed into by Mr. Brems' truck.

R. 378:149-50.

He

testified that after the collision, all three occupants of the
Monte Carlo started chasing Mr. Brems.
7

R. 378:151.

He testified

that the individual with the gun got out the passenger side of the
Monte Carlo.

R. 378:151-2.

station to call the police.

Mr. Lubbers ran to a nearby Conoco
R. 378:152.

People in the station

were already calling the police, so he went back outside and saw
the Monte Carlo start to leave.

R. 378:160-1.

He went back into

the street to get a license plate number from the Monte Carlo.
378:152.

R.

He watched the Monte Carlo hit a Subaru, then all three

chased Mr. Brems.

From 50 yards away, "it looked like they were

all pummeling him.

You know, I wasn't close enough to see who

exactly was hitting whom, but I did see that they were all beating
up on this guy."

R. 378:153.

Earl Bramhall was the driver of the Subaru who Mr. Brems
stopped to call the police. R. 378:163, --166-9.

He estimates the

Monte Carlo struck Mr. Brems at 2 0 or 3 0 miles per hour.
378:168.

R.

Mr. Bramhall described to the police the driver of the

Monte Carlo at that point in time as having long black wavy hair.
R. 378:218.

Compare State Ex. 24, Def. Ex. 2 (Viliamu Seumanu had

long black wavy hair).

The front seat passengers chased Mr. Brems,

while the third person threw the handgun back into the Monte Carlo.
R. 378:170.

He later joined the other two where they had dragged

Mr. Brems to a fence. R. 378:171. Mr. Bramhall testified that all
three were beating Mr. Brems.
away.

R. 378:183.

R. 378:171.

He was 30 to 40 feet

In addition to the three people from the Monte

Carlo, there were about four additional people there at the scene
of the fight trying to separate things.

R. 378:184-5.

police officer arrived within 30 or 45 seconds.
8

The first

R. 378:185.

Duane
Subaru.

Banks was

R. 378:179.

in a vehicle

behind

Mr.

Bramhall's

He recalls that, after it struck Mr. Brems

and the Subaru, three or four people got out of the car, pursued
Mr. Brems, and beat him up against a fence for "a good 5 minutes."
R. 378:190-2. Mr. Banks testified that it seemed that everyone was
fighting.

R. 378:197.

However, in a recorded phone conversation

with an investigator, he stated that two men were fighting one, and
two were standing around.
just

standing

around

R. 381:5.

as having

He described one of the men

a long ponytail, R.

3 81:6,

a

description that fits Mr. Leleae.
Officer William McCarthy was the first officer on scene.
R. 379:16.

He had just turned east onto 3500 South from 4300 West

when he received the call of shots fired on the road.
turn and drove the one block to the scene.
a

R. 3 78:223.

He did a UHe noticed

female leading a white male away from the scene, and three

Polynesians who appeared to be scuffling with two others wearing
Delta Airline uniforms.
State

Ex.

24 and

R. 378:223-4, 379:15.

25, along with Def. Ex. 1, were

individuals fighting with the uniformed ones.
all five sit on the curb.
378:225.
took

some

He testified that

R. 378:225.

the

R. 3 78:224.

three
He had

His weapon was drawn.

R.

The Delta employees were immediately compliant, but it
time

to get

the others

to sit.

R.

378:225.

He

transported two of the individuals, including Mr. Leleae, to the
jail.

R. 378:228.

recorder running.

He left them in the car alone, with his video
R. 378:229-232, 379:8-10.

9

The Delta employees

left the scene without any officer getting their names. R. 379:11,
--16.
Officer Julia Jorgenson testified that she responded to
the 911 call in "about a minute."
officer to arrive.

R. 378:214.

R. 378:207.

She was the second

She testified that there were

seven people by the fence, five of whom were Polynesian.
378:208-9,
uniforms.
378:216.

--214-5.

Two were wearing airline baggage

R. 378:209.

handler

All five Polynesians were very upset.

All seven were ordered to sit on the curb.

R.

R.

R. 378:216.

She recovered the revolver, which contained five spent
casings, from the Monte Carlo.

R. 378:210-1.

Her initial report

indicates that the dispatch log identified a 25 year old hispanic
with a gun wearing a white shirt.

R. 378:217.

Compare State Ex.

25 (Edwin Seumanu wearing a white shirt).
Detective Kevin Nudd interviewed the suspects at the
police station.

Mr. Leleae was interviewed at 2:15 A.M.

interview was videotaped.

See R. 402 (transcription). Mr. Leleae

initially indicated that he was merely a bystander.
--49.

The

R. 3 79:31,

"He changed his story as to how he got there and how it was

that he knew the people that were in the car."

R. 379:31.

He said

that after the accident, he took the gun from one of the others and
put it in the car.
trying to do this.

R. 379:33-4.

The gun went off while he was

R. 379:34.

When confronted with the fact that he and Viliamu had
been recorded in the police car, he agreed to tell the truth.

He

had been drinking beer in a park with Edwin and Viliamu Seumanu.
10

R. 379:36.

Edwin owned the Monte Carlo.

R. 379:37, --50.

Leleae was driving when the shooting started.

Mr.

R. 379:37, --50.

After they all exited after the first collision, Edwin did the
driving

f rom

collision,

then

Edwin

on.

and

assaulting Mr. Brems.

R.

379:37,

Viliamu

got

—51.

out

R. 379:38, --52.

of

After
the

the

car

second

and

began

Mr. Leleae said that he

tried to break up the fight and pull them off the victim.
379:31-2, --33, --38.
assaulting Mr. Brems.

R.

Mr. Leleae said he was not involved in
R. 3 79:52.

Detective Nudd was permitted to

testify that Mr. Leleae said "he didn't want to be a punk and just
stand there and not do anything" without requiring the prosecution
to place this statement into proper context.

R. 379:3 9-4 0.

Mr. Leleae ! s hands were not swollen or injured in any
fashion.

R.3 79:53.

Viliamu's hands were

scratches on his knuckles.
scratches on his knuckles.

quite

swollen

with

Edwin's hands had a couple little
R. 379:64.

Debra Bryant was the woman who tried to assist Mr. Brems.
She testified that the Seumanu brothers first set upon Mr. Brems,
and were involved in the assault from start to finish.
87.

They were joined by a third.

R. 3 79:83-

She testified that this third

person also struck Mr. Brems in the face.

R. 3 79:87.

Edwin Seumanu testified that he and his brother beat up
Mr. Brems.

R. 379:108.

He did not see Mr. Leleae there at that

time, punching Mr. Brems or otherwise.

R. 379:108-9.

Polynesians in uniforms pulled him off Mr. Brems.

11

The two

R. 379:114.

Appellant testified that while he was driving the Monte
Carlo, he accidentally cut off Mr. Brems.

R. 381:20-1, --66. Mr.

Brems responded by passing and cutting off the Monte Carlo.
Edwin Seumanu fired a gun.

R. 3 81:22.

Then

Prior to that time, Mr.

Leleae was unaware that there was a gun in the car.

R. 3 81:23.

After Mr. Brems backed into the Monte Carlo, Mr. Leleae got out
because Viliamu, in the back seat, wanted out of the two door car.
R. 381:26-7. Mr. Leleae retrieved the gun from Edwin and put it in
the car.

R.

381:29-30.

After looking at the damage

to the

vehicles, Edwin jumped into the driver's seat and said, "Get in,
let's go."

R. 381:30-31.

Mr. Leleae got in, thinking that they

would leave the scene. R. 3 81:31.

After Edwin swerved and hit Mr.

Brems and the red Subaru, Edwin and Viliamu got out and started
beating Mr. Brems.

R. 381:36, --80-1.

When they got to the fence

and started beating him more severely, Mr. Leleae got out and tried
to pull Edwin off of Mr. Brems.

R. 381:36-9, --81.

He succeeded

in pulling Edwin off, while the Delta employees pulled off Viliamu.
R. 381:41-2.

Edwin broke the rear windshield wiper on the Subaru,

and then reengaged Mr. Brems.

R. 381:43-4.

Mr. Leleae was trying

to get away from the fight when the police arrived.

R. 381:45.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in allowing the charge to go to the
jury as second degree felony aggravated assault.

Where a bone is

broken and heals in the normal course, the injury only constitutes
substantial bodily

injury, supporting a finding only of

degree felony aggravated assault.
12

third

Mr. Leleae was denied due process in jury selection.

The

trial court refused to ask the panel three questions, from which a
direct inference of bias could be established.

The trial court

also improperly denied a well taken for-cause challenge.

Mr.

Leleae was not provided sufficient information to intelligently
exercise his remaining peremptory strikes.
The
prosecution

trial

to

court

place

a

erred

in

refusing

fragment

of

Mr.

to

Leleae's

force

the

videotaped

statement into proper context to prevent misleading the jury.

The

rule of completeness, requiring that statements be put in proper
context at the time they are introduced, was violated.

Mr. Leleae

was prejudiced, and should be granted a new trial.
The gang enhancement statute is unconstitutional.

As a

matter of state due process, it defines a new offense which should
be accorded the usual constitutional protections.
a

reasonable

tendency

to

further

its

It fails to have

legislative

purpose

of

targeting criminal street gangs in violation of article I, section
24 and federal equal protection.

It violates state and federal due

process due to its arbitrary and capricious failure to achieve
those goals.

It is unconstitutionally vague as a result of its

failure to provide sufficient guidance to sentencing judges.

It

should be stricken.
The trial court erred in refusing to impose a lesser 0-5
year sentence for the gang enhancement under the Shondel doctrine.
The elements
overlap.

of

conspiracy

and those of the gang

enhancement

Any time the gang enhancement is found to be applicable,
13

the

crime

of

conspiracy

has

likewise

been

committed.

Under

Shondel, Mr. Leleae is entitled to the lesser sentence of

0-5

years.
ARGUMENT
POINT

I.
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL WAS
INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT THE VICTIM
SUSTAINED "SERIOUS BODILY INJURY."

Mr.

Leleae

was

convicted

of

second

degree

felony

aggravated assault under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1) (a) (Supp.
1998),

requiring proof of intentionally causing serious bodily

injury.

"Serious bodily injury," a term of art, is defined in Utah

Code Ann.

§ 76-1-601(10)

(Supp. 1998) as

"bodily

injury

that

creates or causes serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss
or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or
creates a substantial risk of death."
A jury verdict is reviewed viewing "the evidence and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to
the verdict."

State v. Seale, 853 P. 2d 862, 865

(Utah), cert,

denied, 510 U.S. 865, 114 S. Ct. 186, 126 L.Ed.2d 145 (1993) . It is
appellant's burden to marshal the evidence supporting the verdict.
State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 819

(Utah App. 1994); State v.

Pilling, 875 P.2d 604, 607-8 (Utah App. 1994).

A jury verdict is

reversed

[so]

only

if

"'the

evidence

...

is

sufficiently

inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the crime of which he was convicted.'"

State v. Span, 819 P.2d

329, 332 (Utah 1991) (quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444
14

(Utah 1983)).

Accord State v. Barlow, 851 P.2d 1191, 1193 (Utah

App.), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993).
Fully
verdict.

marshaled,

the

evidence

fails

to

support

the

The victim, Kenny Brems, testified at trial as to his

injuries:
[
A.] I had some minor head injuries. Wasn't too
serious and a broken jaw.
t
Q.] Were you treated for that broken jaw?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Where was that?
A.
I was at [St.] Marks. Went to Pioneer first
and they couldn't put me in surgery that night. So I had
to wait until Monday and I had surgery at Saint Mark's
Q.
Tell us about your surgery.
A.
The surgery actually went pretty good. I went
in and they wired me up and they told me I could spend
the night.
I really didn't care to.
So I went back
home. That was pretty good. The hardest part of all of
that was just not being able to eat.
R. 378:108-9.

His jaw was wired shut for about a month and a half.

R. 378:110. To assist in eating, a tooth or bridge was temporarily
removed to allow space for a straw.
bridge is back now.
further

R. 378:109-10.

care was necessary.

recovered,

except

R.

R. 378:109.

After the jaw was unwired, no
378:110.

that Mr. Brems

finds

His jaw has

it painful

flashlight in his teeth the way he did formerly.
-142.

That tooth or

fully

to hold

a

R. 378:110, -141,

Mr. Brems lost 20 pounds while his jaw was wired shut, but

at the time of trial, six and a half months after the assault, had
gained back all but five pounds.

R. 378:110-11.

For purposes of determining the levels of assault, Utah
law divides injuries into three categories.

The least

severe

category, "bodily injury," is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-115

601(3) (Supp. 1998) as "physical pain, illness, or any impairment
of physical condition."

The intermediate category, "substantial

bodily injury," is defined as "bodily injury, not amounting to
serious bodily injury, that creates or causes protracted physical
pain, temporary disfigurement, or temporary loss or impairment of
the function of any bodily member or organ."
1-601(10)

(Supp.

1998).

Finally,

Utah Code Ann. § 76-

"serious bodily

injury"

is

defined as "bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any
bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of death."
Here, there was no evidence of any injury creating a
substantial risk of death.

Likewise, there was no evidence of any

disfigurement, protracted or temporary. Thus, the determination of
whether Mr. Brem's broken jaw constitutes substantial bodily injury
or serious bodily injury turns on whether the loss or impairment of
the use of his jaw was temporary or protracted.
The language used in the bodily injury definitions is
admittedly imprecise.
temporary.
the

Protracted impairments can be nonetheless

Whether an event is protracted necessarily depends on

reference

time

scale.

The

statute

provides

no

explicit

guidance as to what period of time is necessary to constitute a
protracted

loss

or

impairment,

so

recourse

to

statutory

construction is necessary.
"One such method of statutory construction is the rule of
noscitur

a sociis,

which provides that the meaning of questionable

words and phrases in a statute be ascertained by reference to words
16

Morton Int f 1, Inc. v. Auditing

or phrases associated with them."

Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 590-1 (Utah 1991) .
"Under the doctrine of ejusdem

generis,

companion doctrine of noscitur

'of the same kind, ' and its

a sociis,

'it is known from its

associates,' when general terms follow specific ones, the general
terms must be given a meaning

that

is restricted

analogous to the preceding specific terms."
P.2d

455,

458

(Utah App.

1991).

Thus,

to a

sense

State v. Vogt, 824
in Vogt

this

Court

determined
This wording of the lewdness involving a child statute
proscribes the exposing of a child to sexual activity,
and the general term 'any other act of gross lewdness' is
restricted to a sense analogous to such wording.
Id.

"[T]he general term ' any other act of gross lewdness' found in

section 76-9-702.5 must be interpreted as referring to acts of
equal gravity as those acts prohibited in the statute . . . "

Id.

With these principles in mind, in assessing the meaning
of protracted in the definition of "serious bodily injury," the
gravity of the protracted loss or impairment of the function of a
body member or organ must be comparable

to the gravity

"serious permanent disfigurement" or an injury that
substantial risk of death."

of a

"creates a

Similarly, in assessing whether a loss

or impairment is merely temporary so as to constitute "substantial
bodily injury," the gravity of the loss or impairment of function
must be comparable to the gravity of "protracted physical pain" or
"temporary disfigurement."
Here, the trial court erred in ruling that a broken jaw
was of comparable gravity to a permanent serious disfigurement or
17

an injury creating a substantial risk of death.

Instead, the

gravity of the injury is squarely comparable to protracted physical
pain or temporary disfigurement.

At the time of trial, Mr. Brem's

jaw was completely healed, except that holding a flashlight in his
mouth

causes him pain.

Notably,

to the extent

this pain

is

considered protracted physical pain, it likewise places this injury
in the "substantial bodily injury" category.

In sum, any broken

bone which is not life threatening and heals normally in the usual
time frame should be considered a temporary loss or impairment of
function, making the injury "substantial bodily injury."

Because

Mr. Brem's injury was not "serious bodily injury," the trial court
erred

in allowing the second degree

charge to go to the jury.
degree

felony aggravated

assault

This Court should vacate the second

felony conviction, and enter judgment

for third

degree

felony aggravated assault.
POINT II. ERRORS IN JURY VOIR DIRE DEPRIVED MR.
LELEAE OF A FAIR TRIAL.
During voir dire, the trial court refused to ask three
questions requested by defendant:
26.
41.

49.

If Mr. Leleae were to testify, would you give his
testimony the same weight and credit that you would
give to any other witness?
If, after hearing the evidence, you came to the
conclusion that the prosecution had not proven the
guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, and
you found that a majority of the jurors believed
the defendant was guilty, would you change your
verdict only because you were in the minority?
You will later be instructed by the judge that the
identification of a person as the perpetrator of a
crime is an expression of belief or impression by
the witness, and that many factors affect the
accuracy of the identification.
Do any of you
believe that an eyewitness can never make a
18

mistake? Would any of you be unable to follow the
judge's instructions about looking at various
factors which could affect the accuracy of
eyewitness identification?
R. 378:74 (request), 139-146 (proposed questions).
The

due

process

clause

of

the

fourteenth

amendment

requires that jurors be questioned concerning areas of possible
bias.

State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 797 (Utah 1991); State v.

Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d 861, 867 (Utah 1998).
court

abused

its discretion

" [W] hether the trial

in conducting voir dire

turns

on

whether, considering the totality of the questioning, counsel was
afforded an adequate opportunity to gain the information necessary
to evaluate jurors."
1988) .

State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448

(Utah

"The trial court must possess discretion in this context

because of the multitude of factual variations that may affect the
proper scope of questioning.

That discretion is strictly limited

where the questions are directly related to bias and prejudice, but
increases as the directness of that relation decreases or, in some
instances, where the question unduly intrudes upon the privacy of
the jurors."

Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d at 868.

Each of the questions propounded was direct, appropriate,
and necessary

for discovering potential bias.

Given that Mr.

Leleae in fact testified, see R. 381:13-120, it was critical that
the defense be able to assess whether jurors would accord that
testimony the weight it deserved.

Being directly related to bias

against the defendant and his testimony, the trial court had little
or no discretion to exclude the question.

19

Likewise, an incorrect answer to either of the other
questions would support a direct inference of bias, and either
support
criminal

a for-cause
law

challenge or require rehabilitation.

requires

that

individual

jurors

exercise

The
their

independent judgment in determining guilt or innocence, and not
surrender their individual views of conscience.

Allen v. United

States, 164 U.S. 492, 501, 17 S.Ct. 154, 157, 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896)
("the

verdict of the jury should represent the opinion of each

individual juror").

The trial court should have determined that

each juror was capable and willing to undertake this burden.
Similarly, eyewitness identification issues were important in this
case, and the trial court should have inquired on this topic.
The trial court also erred in failing to strike juror
Steven Wright.

Mr. Wright had daily interaction with Detective

Nudd for a month and a half when he was an explorer some 14 or 15
years earlier.

Det. Nudd was a physical education instructor for

the

Mr. Wright

program.

physically.

found

the program

very

challenging

"I know at the time it was hard because he was pushing

us to exercise and stuff real hard at the time, but no, not now.
I got over it right after.

I realized it was something good that

happened to me and not bad."

R. 401A:265.

As a result of this

positive experience with Det. Nudd, it is likely that Mr. Wright
would give the detective's testimony undue credit. Under U.R.Cr.P.
18(e)(4), he should have been stricken.
"[T]he
heightened by

importance

of

adequate

voir

dire

has

been

[the] decision in State v. Menzies, 889 P. 2d 393
20

(Utah 1994) . " Piansiaksone, 954 P. 2d at 868. Appellant was forced
to use his first peremptory strike on this juror.

R. 200.

As a

result, each of the remaining peremptory strikes became that much
more important.

Mr. Leleae was deprived of an opportunity to

develop facts to support a challenge for cause for jurors who were
unwilling

or

unable

appropriate weight,

(1)

to

accord

Mr.

Leleae's

testimony

(2) to hold fast to good faith beliefs of

conscience, or (3) to correctly follow the law set forth in the
Long instruction. Mr. Leleae was deprived of one peremptory strike
by the

trial

court's erroneous

for-cause

ruling, and was not

afforded an adequate opportunity to gain the information necessary
to evaluate jurors so as to intelligently exercise the remaining
three strikes due to the trial court's failure to ask questions 26,
41, and 49.

Mr. Leleae's right to due process was violated.

This

Court should reverse.
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PRECLUDING THE
DEFENSE FROM INTRODUCING THE RELATED PORTIONS
OF
MR.
LELEAE'S
STATEMENT
DURING
THE
PROSECUTION'S PRESENTATION UNDER THE RULE OF
COMPLETENESS, WHERE THEY WERE NECESSARY TO
DISPEL
MISCONCEPTIONS
CREATED
BY
THE
PROSECUTION'S INTRODUCTION OF AN ISOLATED, OUT
OF CONTEXT FRAGMENT OF THE STATEMENT.
A.

FACTS UNDERLYING COMPLETENESS CLAIM.

After his arrest, Mr. Leleae gave a lengthy statement to
Detective Kevin Nudd, which concluded with the following:
JL:

You know what, you tell the truth, you doin something you
don't feel like doing, like this situation when I was
driving and you know something is wrong but you can't do
nothing about it because you in it already, you know.
That's the only feeling that was hitting me when they
were beating up the man, you know, when I see the two of
them going at it beating up a man not even a man just
21

KN:

another person too, another white man[] with long hair,
it wasn't really hard for me to try to hold them back
because they are my friends and when they beat the man
down, you know what my feelings was, you know, should I
help them beat up the man or should I just stand here, I
don't want to be a punk and just stand there and not
doing nothing and that was the only thing on my mind. If
I wasn't the one that was shooting, I wasn't the one
driving, I would probably of beat the man. I know since
I tell the truth, that everybody over there that would
recognize me from when they were beating up the man, they
know that I wasn't laying a hand on nobody that I was
trying to hold my boy back, the big one, the one owned
the car. This was enough you know other people around.
I know that I was drunk you know. But then again I know
what I was doing.
Well I appreciate you telling us the truth. It makes it
easier to figure things out because things just weren't
fitting together. John at this time, we are going to go
back and talk to one of the other guys to see if he will
come clean and talk to us. We are going to put you back
into the room for a few minutes and then we will let you
know what we are going to do. O.K.?
This will conclude this interview the time is 0252 hours.

R. 402:30-31 (attached as addendum B ) .
The prosecution filed a motion in limine to allow it to
admit selected portions of this statement, while simultaneously
precluding the defense from introducing the surrounding portions to
provide a non-misleading context.

R. 379:2-7.

The trial court

granted the motion, simultaneously denying Mr. Leleae's motion to
admit other portions:
THE COURT: I am going to deny the request for
admission under 106.
First of all, based upon its
express language I am not satisfied that it applies.
Even if it were to apply, I am of the opinion that the
competing interest of -- well, let me restate that.
That the nature of self-serving statements do
not persuade this court that I ought to exercise
discretion under Rule 106 and allow any remaining
portions of the statement to come in because of fairness.
In this court's view at this point, the fairness argues
in favor of keeping out the self-serving statements.
R. 379:6-7.
22

The prosecutor elicited testimony concerning Mr. Leleae ! s
statement from Detective Nudd as follows:
Q.
Toward the end of the interview, Det.
Nudd, what did John say his feelings were about what was
going on?
A.
He told me that after the shooting
started, felt there just wasn't anything he could do, so
he continued in the car with them and them once the
accident happened, he said that he was with them, and
once they started assaulting him, he said he felt like he
didn't want to be a punk and support his friends, but
didn't know whether or not to do anything to the guy.
Q.
Did he say he didn' t want to be a punk and
just stand there and not do anything?
A.
Yes.
R.

379:39-40.

Defense counsel was precluded

from

introducing

surrounding portions at that time to bring this statement into
proper context.
B.

THE RULE OF COMPLETENESS.

The rule of completeness has longstanding lineage.
a century ago the Supreme Court stated:
If it were competent for one party to prove this
conversation, it was equally competent for the other
party to prove their version of it. . . . [W]here the
whole or a part of a conversation has been put in
evidence by one party, the other party is entitled to
explain, vary, or contradict it.
United States v. Carver, 164 U.S. 694, 696-7 (1897).
[I] f one party to litigation puts in evidence part of a
document, or a correspondence or a conversation, which is
detrimental to the opposing party, the latter may
introduce the balance of the document, correspondence or
conversation in order to explain or rebut the adverse
inferences which might arise from the fragmentary or
incomplete character of the evidence introduced by his
adversary.[]
The rationale
of the doctrine
of
completeness has been stated by Professor Wigmore: 'To
look at a part (of an utterance) alone would be to obtain
a false notion of the thought. . . . One part cannot be
separated and taken by itself without doing injustice, by
producing misrepresentation'; and again, 'possibilities
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of error lie in trusting to a fragment of an utterance
without knowing what the remainder was' ; consideration of
the whole is needed 'to avoid the danger of mistaking the
effect of a fragment. ' []
United

States v. Corricran, 168 F.2d

641, 645

(2nd Cir. 1948)

(footnote cites omitted).
Utah case law is in accord.
1097,

1109

(Utah

1935),

the

In State v. Dunklev, 3 9 P. 2d

Supreme

Court

held

regarding

confessions that "where the statement contains both disserving and
self-serving statements, the whole must be admitted and considered
by the jury."
In view of all this, how stands the case?
Certainly the court could not properly have admitted in
evidence only the disserving statements by excluding the
self-serving, and, when both were admitted, the jury
could not be permitted to do what the court could not
have done, consider only the disserving and reject the
self-serving, or to believe the disserving and disbelieve
the self-serving, unless there is something either
intrinsic or extrinsic to render the self-serving
questionable or doubtful or inconsistent.

The rule of completeness is currently embodied in Rule
106, Utah Rules of Evidence, which provides:
When a writing or recorded statement or part
thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may
require the introduction at that time of any other part
or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in
fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it.
There are no Utah cases discussing this rule.

However, this rule

is identical to the federal rule, and decisions under that rule are
persuasive authority.

State v. Smith, 817 P. 2d 828, 829 (Utah App.

1991) ("The Utah rule is identical to its federal counterpart" and
therefore federal interpretations of the rule are persuasive.").
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As the Advisory Committee's Note to Fed. R. Evid. 106
makes

clear,

completeness."

" [t]he

rule

is

an

expression

of

the

rule

of

The Note further describes the purposes of the

rule:
The rule is based on two considerations. The
first is the misleading impression created by taking
matters out of context. The second is the inadequacy of
repair work when delayed to a point later int the trial.
See McCormick § 56; California Evidence Code § 356.
Although Rule 106 addresses only writings and recordings,
the rule of completeness is still applicable to oral statements,
whether recorded or not:
As we see it, by its terms the rule refers to
written or recorded statements.
However Rule 611(a)
gives the district courts the same authority with respect
to oral statements and testimonial proof. See Weinsteins
Evidence Vol. 1, 106-4 (1992 Ed.)
United

States v. Haddad,

Alternatively,

the

10 F.3d

prosecution's

1252, 1258
questioning

(7th Cir.

1993).

concerning

the

statement was "tantamount to the introduction of the [transcribed
statement] into evidence."

Rainey v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 784

F.2d 1523, 1529 n.ll (11th Cir. 1986) , reinstated en banc, 827 F.2d
1498 (11th Cir. 1987), aff'd and rev'd in part on other grounds,
488 U.S. 153, 109 S. Ct. 439, 102 L.Ed.2d 445 (1988) ; accord United
States

v.

Rubin,

609

F.2d

51, 63

(2nd Cir.

1979)

(rule

106

implicated where "notes had been used extensively and quoted from"
during examination of witness), aff'd, 449 U.S. 424, 101 S.Ct. 698,
66 L.Ed.2d 633 (1981).
When confronted with a completeness claim, the trial
court has two options:
25

If otherwise inadmissible evidence is necessary to
correct a misleading impression, then either it is
admissible for this limited purpose by force of Rule 106,
the view taken in 21 Wright & Graham, Federal Practice
and Procedure Sec. 5072, at p. 344 (1977), or, if it is
inadmissible (maybe because of privilege), the misleading
evidence must be excluded too.
United States v. LeFevour, 798 F.2d 977, 981 (7th Cir. 1986).
The

prosecution's

contention

at

R.

3 79:5

that

the

defendant should instead be forced to take the stand is not well
taken:
In criminal cases where the defendant elects
not to testify, as in the present case, more is at stake
than the order of proof.
If the Government is not
required to submit all relevant portions of prior
testimony which further explain selected parts which the
Government has offered, the excluded portions may never
be admitted. Thus there may be no "repair work" which
could remedy the unfairness of a selective presentation
later in the trial of such a case.
United States v. Walker, 652 F.2d 708, 713 (7th Cir. 1981).

This

is not a case of the defendant attempting to manipulate matters to
his own benefit. Rather, the prosecution was attempting to mislead
the jury by admitting Mr. Leleae's statement about not wanting "to
be a punk and just stand there and not doing nothing" in isolation
and out

of

context

so that the jury would draw an

incorrect

inference from it.
Evidence needed to correct the misleading impression is
admissible

irrespective

of

whether

it

would

otherwise

admissible:
The structure of the Federal Rules of Evidence indicates
that Rule 106 is concerned with more than merely the
order of proof. Rule 106 is found not in Rule 611, which
governs the "Mode and Order of Interrogation and
Presentation," but in Article I, which contains rules
that generally restrict the manner of applying the
26

be

exclusionary rules. See C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal
Practice and Procedure: Evidence Sec. 5078, at 376 (1977
& 1986 Supp.). Moreover, every major rule of exclusion
in the Federal Rules of Evidence contains the proviso,
"except as otherwise provided by these rules, "C] which
indicates "that the draftsmen knew of the need to provide
for relationships between rules and were familiar with a
technique for doing this." Id. There is no such proviso
in Rule 106, which indicates that Rule 106 should not be
so restrictively construed. See id. []
Rule 106 can adequately fulfill its function
only by permitting the admission of some otherwise
inadmissible evidence when the court finds in fairness
that the proffered evidence should be considered
contemporaneously. A contrary construction raises the
specter of distorted and misleading trials, and creates
difficulties for both litigants and the trial court.
United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1368
(footnotes omitted).
at

1-33

(1996)

(D.C. Cir. 1986)

Accord Kimball and Boyce, Utah Evidence Law

("if

the objectionable

evidence

(for example,

hearsay) is needed to provide context and understanding, fairness
seems to require its admission").

The State's argument in the

trial court that Rule 106 does not control over the hearsay rule,
R. 3 79:5-6, is contrary to law and must be rejected.
C.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PRECLUDING THE
DEFENSE
FROM
PLACING
MR.
LELEAE*S
STATEMENT IN PROPER CONTEXT AT THE TIME
THE EVIDENCE WAS INTRODUCED.

Mr. Leleae's defense was that, while he was present at
the

scene,

he

did

not

participate

in

assaulting

Mr.

Brems.

Instead, he attempted to get the Seumanu brothers to stop the
assault.
being

one

Mr. Brems could not positively identify Mr. Leleae as
of

the

attackers.

R.

378::115,

--138.

Other

eyewitnesses were some distance away and may have mistaken the role
of Mr. Leleae in the tumultuous situation.
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The prosecution elicited evidence concerning Mr. Leleae's
statement through Detective Nudd:
Q.
Did he say he didn't want to be a punk and
just stand there and not do anything?
A.
Yes.
R. 379:39-40.

This statement was offered as an invitation to the

jury to draw an inference that, because Mr. Leleae did not want to
"be a punk and just stand there," he must have participated in the
brutal assault of Mr. Brems.

From the isolated fragment of Mr.

Leleae's statement that the prosecution put before the jury, no
other inference could be drawn.
However, this inference is incorrect.

Taken in context,

the import of Mr. Leleae's statement was that, because he did not
want to stand around and do nothing, he actively attempted to get
the Seumanu brothers to stop assaulting Mr. Brems:
JL:

You know what, you tell the truth, you doin something you
don't feel like doing, like this situation when I was
driving and you know something is wrong but you can't do
nothing about it because you in it already, you know.
That's the only feeling that was hitting me when they
were beating up the man, you know, when I see the two of
them going at it beating up a man not even a man just
another person too, another white man[] with long hair,
it wasn't
really
hard for me to try to hold them back
because they are my friends and when they beat the man
down, you know what my feelings
was, you know, should I
help them beat up the man or should I just stand here, I
don't
want to be a punk and just
stand there and not
doing nothing
and that was the only thing on my mind. If
I wasn't the one that was shooting, I wasn't the one
driving, I would probably of beat the man. I know
since
I tell
the truth,
that everybody
over there that
would
recognize
me from when they were beating up the man, they
know that I wasn't
laying
a hand on nobody that I was
trying
to hold my boy back, the big one, the one owned
the car.
This was enough you know other people around.
I know that I was drunk you know. But then again I know
what I was doing.
28

R. 402:30-31 (emphasis added).

The jury correctly inferred that

Mr. Leleae was spurred to action, but was completely misled as to
the nature of that action.

The remainder of the statement was

necessary to reveal the true tenor of Mr. Leleae's statement and
avoid misleading the jury:
Under this doctrine of completeness, a second writing may
be required to be read if it is necessary to (1) explain
the admitted portion, (2) place the admitted portion in
context, (3) avoid misleading the trier of fact, or (4)
insure a fair and impartial understanding.
United States v. Soures, 736 F.2d 87, 91 (3rd Cir. 1984) (citing
United States v. Marin, 669 F.2d 73, 84 (2d Cir.1982)).

For each

and every of these reasons, the remainder of Mr. Leleae's statement
was necessary at that time. Viewed fairly in context, Mr. Leleae's
statement indicates that he was spurred to action and attempted to
break up the assaultive behavior of the Seumanus.
D.

MR. LELEAE WAS PREJUDICED.

Confessions

have

possible evidence of guilt."

been

called

"the

most

compelling

State v. Bolsinger, 699 P. 2d 1214,

1222 (Utah 1985) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 466, 86
S.Ct. 1602, 1623-4, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (quoting Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 685, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1707, 6 L.Ed.2d
(Harlan, J., dissenting))).

1081

(1961)

The trial court's action changed the

perceived meaning and effect of Mr. Leleae's statement from the
exculpatory

statement

that

it was into a highly

incriminating

confession.

The jury was misled, and the trial rendered unfair.

The evidence of Mr. Leleae's complicity was thin at best.
He was the only one that had no cuts, bruising, or swelling of his
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knuckles, R. 3 79:53, --67, strong circumstantial evidence that he
threw no punches.
evidence,

it

Given the unconvincing character of the other

is likely

that

the

jury

convicted

based

on

its

perception that Mr. Leleae confessed that "he didn't want to be a
punk and just stand there and not do anything."

No amount of

subsequent repair work could alter the impression left with the
jurors that Mr. Leleae had confessed.

Absent the court's improper

ruling on the completeness issue, it is reasonably likely that the
jury would have acquitted.
POINT IV. THE GANG ENHANCEMENT SHOULD BE STRICKEN
AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.2
A.

THE GANG ENHANCEMENT DEFINES A SEPARATE
OFFENSE
SUBJECT
TO
ALL
OF
THE
CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTIONS
ACCORDED
CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS.

Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution and the
sixth amendment to the federal constitution guarantee defendants
the right to a jury trial.

A jury, rather than the trial court,

should make the factual findings concerning the applicability of
the gang enhancement.

Under article I, section 7 and the fifth and

fourteenth amendments, defendants have a due process right to be
presumed

innocent until the elements of an offense are proven

beyond a reasonable doubt.

Article I, section 13 guarantees the

right to a preliminary hearing to establish probable cause on all
elements of an offense prior to being bound over for trial.

2

These constitutional challenges are currently pending before
the Supreme Court in State v. Cameron Lopes, No. 960551 (Utah,
argued Nov. 12, 1997).
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The gang enhancement statute states that " [t]his section
does not create any separate offense but provides an enhanced
penalty for the primary offense."

The legislature is elevating

form over substance -- in fact a new offense, with an additional
element, has been created.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501

(1995)

defines elements of criminal offenses as the conjunction of "[t]he
conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of conduct proscribed,
prohibited, or forbidden in the definition of the offense" and
" [t]he culpable mental state required."

The conduct proscribed in

the gang enhancement satisfies both prongs of this element test.
"In concert" describes both the proscribed conduct and attendant
circumstances of the offense.

The mental state of the primary

offense likewise must be shown.

The gang enhancement statute is

not an enhancement at all; it defines new offenses with the added
element of "in concert with two or more persons."
Indeed the new offenses defined by the gang enhancement
have always existed.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-201 (1995) sets forth

the elements of conspiracy.

Of course, Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-

402(3) (b) (1995) has heretofore precluded conviction of both an
offense

and

enhancement
provides

conspiracy
achieves

an

to

commit

end

run

that

around

offense.

The

this prohibition,

gang
and

for a longer sentence than a separate conviction for

conspiracy would.

See argument in Point V, infra at 48.

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068,
L.Ed.2d 368, 375

, 25

(1970) definitively held that "the Due Process

Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof
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beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged."

In Mullanev v. Wilbur, 421 U.S.

684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975) the court held it was
impermissible for the State of Maine to require a defendant to
prove by a preponderance that he acted in the heat of passion to
reduce his conviction from murder to manslaughter:
[I]f Winship were limited to those facts that constitute
a crime as defined by state law, a State could undermine
many of the interests that decision sought to protect
without effecting any substantive change in its law. It
would only be necessary to redefine the elements that
constitute different crimes, characterizing them as
factors that bear solely on the extent of punishment.
Mullanev, 421 U.S. at 698.
In McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 2411,
91 L.Ed.2d

67

(1986),

the court upheld

a Pennsylvania

scheme

whereby a 5 year mandatory minimum sentence is imposed if the trial
judge finds by a preponderance that the defendant visibly possessed
a firearm during the commission of the offense.

The court noted

that there is little risk of error in the trial court making such
a determination.

McMillan, 477 U.S. at 84.

The court reiterated

that there are constitutional limits to a State's power to redefine
crimes in circumvention of Winship, but declined to specify the
precise confines of those limits.

Id. at 86-7.

However, the

court noted, " [t]he statute gives no impression of having been
tailored to permit the visible possession finding to be a tail
which wags the dog of the substantive offense."

Id. at 88.

While the "tail wagging the dog" metaphor used by the
Supreme Court is admittedly imprecise, the sense of what is meant
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is clear.

Sentencing considerations must involve additional facts

which are few in number, capable of easy determination, and not
subject to any appreciable risk of error in their determination.
The gang enhancement

statute exceeds the permissible

limits of offense definition allowed by the due process clause, and
should be stricken as violative of the due process clause.

Unlike

the "visible possession" finding at issue in McMillan, the "in
concert" finding here involves complicated determinations of the
intent of other individuals, who need not be apprehended or even
identified.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1(5)(b).

One of the motivating concerns in Winship was the need
for accurate fact determinations in criminal cases.
363.

397 U.S. at

The gang enhancement statute undermines this paramount goal

and invites perfunctory application of the enhancement without the
careful, considered fact-finding it properly warrants.
Proof of "in concert" activity requires proof that two
other actors committed a crime in conjunction with the primary
offense.
actor

The enhancement is only applicable if each additional

"commits

the

offense,

solicits,

requests,

commands,

encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage
conduct which constitutes an offense."

in

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202

(1995), as applicable through § 76-3-203.1(1)(b).
Of the three (or more) criminal actors, the State is only
required to prove to the jury that one is guilty.

The enhancement

statute attempts to transform proof that the other two (or more)
are

culpable

into

a sentencing
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function.

Two

thirds

of

the

required facts are relegated to the sentencing court's perfunctory
determination that the enhancement is applicable.
of the necessary facts are proven to the jury.

Only one third

The statute here

falls outside the rule of McMillan, and must be stricken.
The Utah Supreme Court has not hesitated to depart from
federal standards when those standards become unworkable.3

Current

federal law addressing offense definition and what constitutes an
element of a given offense has become unworkable and should be
rejected.
In Mullanev v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44
L.Ed.2d 508 (1975), the Supreme Court struck down a Maine statute
providing

that

malice

aforethought

would

be

presumed

and

an

intentional and unlawful homicide is murder unless the defendant
proved by a preponderance that he acted in the heat of passion on
sudden provocation.

The Court conducted an historical review of

murder and manslaughter and observed:
First, the fact at issue here -- the presence or absence
of heat of passion on sudden provocation -- has been,
almost from the inception of the common law of homicide,
the single most important factor in determining the
degree of culpability attaching to an unlawful homicide.
And, second, the clear trend has been toward requiring

3

E.g. , State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 780 (Utah 1991)
(rejecting some aspects of federal model for analyzing eyewitness
identifications); Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734
(Utah 1991) (recognizing due process rights in parole hearings);
State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 417-8 (Utah 1991) (rejecting
federal doctrine that bank depositors have no expectation of
privacy in bank records); see also State v. Hvah, 711 P.2d 264,
271-2 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring, noting federal law
had become a "labyrinth of rules built upon a series of
contradictory and confusing rationalizations and distinctions," and
advocating separate state constitutional construction).
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the prosecution to bear the ultimate burden of proving
this fact.
Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 696.

The court concluded that "By drawing

this distinction [between murder and manslaughter] , while refusing
to require the prosecution to establish beyond a reasonable doubt
the fact upon which it turns, Maine denigrates the interests found
critical in Winship."

Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 698.

A unanimous

court reversed.
In Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 97 S. Ct. 2319, 53
L.Ed.2d 281 (1977), five members of the Court reached a result the
practical result of which is directly contrary to that in Mullaney.
The New York statute at issue required the defendant to prove the
affirmative
preponderance
manslaughter.

defense
to

of

extreme

reduce
The

a

Court

emotional

second

degree

characterized

disturbance
murder
the

by

charge

defense

as

a
to
"a

considerably expanded version of the common-law defense of heat of
passion on sudden provocation . . . "

Patterson, 432 U.S. at 202.

The Court further characterized the definition of murder at issue
in Mullaney as including the absence of provocation.

Patterson,

432 U.S. at 215-6.
The

dissent

took

the

majority

to

task

over

inconsistency with Mullaney:
The Court manages to run a constitutional boundary line
through the barely visible space that separates Maine's
law from New York's.
It does so on the basis of
distinctions in language that are formalistic rather than
substantive.
. . . Winship was violated [in Mullaney] only
because this fact -- malice -- was "presumed" unless the
defendant persuaded the jury otherwise by showing that he
acted in the heat of passion."
New York, in form
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presuming no affirmative fact against Patterson,[] and
blessed with a statute drafted in the leaner language of
the 20th century, escapes constitutional
scrutiny
unscathed even though the effect on the defendant of New
York's placement of the burden of persuasion is exactly
the same as Maine' s. . . .
With all respect, this type of constitutional
adjudication is indefensibly formalistic. A limited but
significant check on possible abuses in the criminal law
now becomes an exercise in arid formalities.
What
Winship and Mullaney had sought to teach about the limits
a free society places on its procedures to safeguard the
liberty of its citizens becomes a rather simplistic
lesson in statutory draftsmanship.
. . . This decision simply leaves us without
a conceptual framework for distinguishing abuses from
legitimate legislative adjustments of the burden of
persuasion in criminal cases."
Patterson, 432 U.S. at 221-5

(Powell, J., joined by Brennan and

Marshall, JJ. , dissenting) . Fundamental constitutional protections
are now relegated under federal due process to the vagaries of
draftsmanship in the state legislatures.
In dissent from McMillan, Justice Stevens sets forth a
practical and workable test:
Once a State defines a
Due Process Clause requires it to
the prohibited transaction that
special stigma and a special
reasonable doubt.

criminal offense, the
prove any component of
gives rise to both a
punishment beyond a

McMillan, 477 U.S. at 96 (Stevens, J. dissenting4) . Under article
I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution, this Court should adopt this
straightforward test.
proven

beyond

a

The conduct of the other actors should be

reasonable

doubt

to

a

jury

before

the

gang

enhancement is applicable.

4

Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun, dissenting, join in
this aspect of Justice Stevens' dissent. 477 U.S. at 94.
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Oregon has followed this approach.
652 P. 2d 773

In State v. Wedge,

(Or. 1982), the Oregon Supreme Court stated that

"facts which constitute the crime are for the jury and those which
characterize the defendant are for the sentencing judge."
at 777.

652 P. 2d

Wedge involved a sentencing enhancement for use of a

firearm in the commission of an offense.

The Oregon court found:

Although the challenged statute is denominated
an enhanced penalty statute, in effect it creates a new
crime.
. . .
The legislature cannot eliminate
constitutional protections by separating and relabeling
elements of a crime.
Wedge. 652 P.2d at 778.
Arizona likewise has drawn distinctions based on whether
the

enhancing

factor

under

consideration

involves

elements of culpability or merely concerns a status.

additional
In State v.

Hurley, 741 P.2d 257, 263 (Ariz. 1987) the Arizona court rejected
the contention that an enhancement based on release status required
a jury determination by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Parole

status has traditionally been a factor considered in sentencing,
has never been an element of a crime in Arizona, and involved no
determination of the conduct or mental state of the defendant.
Proof

involves

objective

evidence

with

little

risk

of

error.

However, in State v. Powers, 742 P.2d 792 (Ariz. 1987), the court
found that the same enhancement based on escape status required a
jury determination:
Thus, unlike the release status considered in
Hurley, escape is a crime in itself. The crime of escape
contains its own elements: the state must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the
requisite intent to escape.
In this case, Powers is
receiving additional punishment based on alleged criminal
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conduct -- escape -- for which no jury has found him
guilty.
Powers, 742 P.2d at 795.
Requiring

a

jury

determination

of

the

"in

concert"

element would bring this area of law into accord with similar
provisions in Utah.

Utah law provides for a jury determination by

proof beyond a reasonable doubt for both the dangerous weapon
enhancement (Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (Supp. 1995)) and under the
habitual criminal statutes
(1995)).

(Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 et seq.

Under Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(4) (Supp. 1998) (providing

for enhanced

penalties

for drug offenses within

1000

feet of

schools, churches, parks, and the like), that the activity occurred
within 1000 feet is an element of the crime that must be found by
the jury.

State v. Powasnik, 918 P.2d 146 (Utah App. 1996).

In

capital cases, aggravating circumstances must be proved to the jury
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Tillman, 750 P. 2d 546, 577-80,
585-88, 591 (Utah 1987) (Stewart, Durham, and Zimmerman, JJ. , in
separate
purposes;

opinions).

The

gang

enhancement

serves

identical

the same protections should apply.
Article I, section 12 and the sixth amendment guarantee

the right to jury trial.

It is well established that the jury is

provided with the sole ability to judge the facts in criminal
matters and to weigh the evidence.
from invading that province.

The law prohibits the judge

State v. Green, 6 P. 2d 177, 181 (Utah

1931); State v. Diaz, 290 P. 727, 731 (Utah 1930); State v. Bruno,
256 P. 109, 110 (Utah 1927); State v. Greene, 94 P. 987, 989 (Utah
1908);

State v. James, 89 P. 460, 463
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(Utah 1907);

People v.

Biddlecome, 2 P. 194 (Utah 1882).

The gang enhancement violates

article I, section 12 by providing that the trial court, rather
than a jury, is to determine whether the crime was committed in
concert with two or more others.
Article I, section 13 guarantees defendants a preliminary
hearing

on

all

designating

offenses.

itself

an

The

gang

enhancement

enhancement

rather

than

a

statute,

by

substantive

offense, deprives defendants of preliminary hearings on the issue
of whether there is probable cause that the crime was committed in
concert

with

two

or more

others.

The

accused's

preliminary hearing is a substantial one.

right

State v. Pay,

to a
146 P.

300 (Utah 1915). The Supreme Court has ruled that unless a criminal
defendant

is

subjected

to

a

preliminary

examination

for

the

violation of a criminal statute, the prosecution is not authorized
to continue with a proceeding relating to the violation. State v.
Jensen, 136 P.2d 949, 951-52 (Utah 1943); State v. Freeman, 71 P.2d
196, 199 (Utah 1937); State v. Nelson, 176 P. 860, 861 (Utah 1918).
The gang enhancement violates article I, section 13 by eliminating
this fundamental right to a preliminary hearing.
The

legislature's

declaration

in

§

76-3-203.1 (5) (a)

notwithstanding, the gang enhancement creates a separate offense by
proscribing conduct and attendant circumstances.

Utah Code Ann. §

76-1-501(2). The constitutional protections applicable to elements
of criminal offenses, including the presumption of innocence, right
to an impartial jury, and right to a preliminary hearing, must be
applied to the "in concert" element of the gang enhancement.
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B.

Under

THE GANG ENHANCEMENT VIOLATES STATE DUE
PROCESS, UNIFORM OPERATION OF LAWS, AND
FEDERAL EQUAL PROTECTION BECAUSE IT FAILS
TO MEET ITS LEGISLATIVE GOALS IN A
REASONABLE MANNER.
article

I,

sections

7

and

24

of

the

Utah

Constitution, and the fourteenth amendment of the United States
Constitution, the gang enhancement is unconstitutional.
The gang enhancement fails the uniform operation of laws
test:
Article I, § 24 protects against two types of
discrimination. First, a law must apply equally to all
persons within a class.
[cites omitted]
Second, the

statutory
classifications
and the different
treatment
given the classes must be based on differences
that have
a reasonable tendency to further the objectives
of the
statute.
[cites omitted] If the relationship
of the
classification
to
the
statutory
objectives
is
unreasonable
or
fanciful,
the
discrimination
is
unreasonable.

[cite omitted]

Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670-71 (Utah 1984) (emphasis added);
accord Greenwood v. City of N. Salt lake, 817 P.2d 816, 820 (Utah
1991); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d 884, 890
(Utah 1988); see also McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191, 85
S.Ct. 283,

, 13 L.Ed.2d 222, 228 (1964) ("Judicial inquiry under

the Equal Protection Clause, therefore, does not end with a showing
of equal application among the members of the class defined by the
legislation.

The courts must reach and determine the question

whether the classifications drawn in a statute are reasonable in
light of its purpose . . . " ) .
State uniform operation analysis is more rigorous than
and

will

always

meet

or

exceed
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the

federal

"rational

basis"

standard.

Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake Citv Corp. , 752

P.2d 884, 890 (Utah 1988).
The gang enhancement statute does not have a reasonable
tendency to further its legislative objectives.

Given the purpose

of the legislation, the classifications drawn in the statute are
unreasonable.
The

The gang enhancement is unconstitutional.
gang

enhancement

statute

legislative objectives on its face.

does

not

The legislative

list

its

history,

attached as addendum D, however, is abundantly clear:
[T] he idea behind the enhanced penalties in California
and the idea here was to get that center core, that's the
core group of hardened criminals that supplies the money,
supplies the impetus for a true criminal street gang.
. . Ah, it gets to the hardened core, and the social
workers tell us that the only thing to do with them to
allow social workers to work with the remainder of the
young people at risk in these gangs is to get that
hardened core off the streets. The enhanced penalty is
designed for that purpose.
. . . But this enhanced
penalty, we have got to get that hard core of the street
gang groups off of the streets, out of the street gangs.
Id. at 3.
This bill is directed at that core criminal element, that
three percent of those six hundred gang members that have
been identified that provide the father figure in these
gangs. And they provide also the connection [with] the
California gangs, the connection to the crack cocaine,
the money that is fueling this explosion of gang activity
in our cities and I'd like to ask you for your support
for this bill and thank you for your time.
Id. at 7.

Debate in the Senate similarly indicates that the bill

was designed to target criminal street gangs.

Legislative History

at 8.
In

the

house

debate,

Representative

Prante

asked

a

question concerning the impact of the legislation on three persons
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acting in concert who were not actual gang members. He was assured
that that potential situation was covered by the definition in §762-2025 and by judicial discretion to not impose the enhancement.
Legislative History at 6.
applied

The gang enhancement is routinely being

to persons who are not

criminal

street

gang members,

contrary to the purposes of the statute.
The

California

"Street

Terrorism

Enforcement

and

Prevention Act," enacted in 1988, is found in Cal. Penal Code §
186.20 et seq.

(Supp. 1996).

Despite the concerns expressed by

Rep. Rushton, thus far the statute has withstood constitutional
challenge.

People v. Gamez, 235 Cal. App. 3d 957, 286 Cal. Rptr.

894 (1991); In re Alberto R.. 235 Cal. App. 3d 1309, 1 Cal. Rptr.
2d 348 (1991).
Unlike the California "Street Terrorism Enforcement and
Prevention Act,"

Cal. Penal Code § 186.20 et seq. (Supp. 1996),

upon which our statue was based, the gang enhancement statute fails
to meet its goals in a rational manner.
the

proper

targets

of

the

enhancement

Rather than designating
in

the

statute,

the

legislature attempted to rely on judicial discretion to ensure that
non-gangmembers

would

not be

sentenced under

the enhancement.

Because the statute fails to delineate the proper scope of its
application, judges have been unable to carry into effect the
intent of the legislature.

The statute fails to further the goals

5

Section 76-2-202 obviously does not address the issue of gang
membership in any fashion.
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of the legislature in combatting the influx and proliferation of
criminal street gangs in Utah.
The

gang

enhancement,

while

intended

to

target

the

hardened core criminal element of criminal street gangs, sets apart
a statutorily defined class of individuals who commit crimes in
concert with 2 or more others.
than the targeted group.

This group is immensely broader

The statutory classification here is not

based on differences that have a reasonable tendency to further the
objectives

of

the

statute.

Since

the

relationship

of

the

classification to the statutory objectives is unreasonable and
fanciful, the discrimination is unreasonable.

Malan v. Lewis, 693

P.2d 661, 670-71 (Utah 1984); Greenwood v. City of N. Salt lake,
817 P.2d 816, 820 (Utah 1991); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,
191,

85 S.Ct. 283,

, 13 L.Ed.2d

222, 228

(1964).

The gang

enhancement should be stricken as unconstitutional.
For the reasons just set forth, the gang enhancement is
likewise

arbitrary

analysis.

and

capricious

E.g. State v. Copeland,

under

a

state

765 P. 2d 1266

due

process

(Utah 1988)

(striking Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-35-21.5(4) (c) and -(d) as violative
of the due process clause) . The gang enhancement should be struck
as unconstitutional in violation of article I, section 7 of the
Utah constitution.
Under the federal scheme, if the statute deals with
sensitive constitutional values or discriminates based on suspect
classifications, the court will apply a heightened scrutiny of
legislative

means

and

ends,

involving
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a

real

and

thoughtful

examination of legislative purpose and the relationship between the
legislation and that purpose. Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P. 2d 572, 582
(Utah 1993); State v. Bell. 785 P.2d 390, 398 (Utah 1989) (strict
scrutiny test is used if a challenged classification is "suspect"
or

if

a

"fundamental

interest"

is

involved);

Condemarin

v.

University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348, 356, 358 (Utah 1989).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 affects fundamental rights
embodied in the state and federal constitutions, including the
right

to

jury

trial,

presumption

of

innocence,

right

to

a

preliminary hearing, and right to due process. Therefore, a strict
scrutiny standard applies.
"classifications

which

rights]

closely

must

be

Under the strict scrutiny standard,

might

invade

scrutinized

or

restrain

and

[fundamental

carefully

confined."

Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670, 86
S.Ct. 1079,
The
While

, 16 L.Ed.2d 169, 174 (1966).
gang

combatting

enhancement

criminal

fails

street

federal

gangs

is a

strict

scrutiny.

legitimate

state

interest, the statute is not narrowly drawn towards that purpose.
Rather than applying strictly, or even primarily, to gangmembers,
the statute

applies to non-gangmembers.

The gang

enhancement

violates federal equal protection, and should be stricken.
C.

THE
GANG
VAGUENESS.

ENHANCEMENT

IS

VOID

FOR

Section 76-3-203.1 is void for vagueness under a federal
due process analysis. Basic principles of due process prohibit the
enactment of a statute if it is vague on its face.
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Vague laws offend several important values.
First,
because we assume that man is free to steer between
lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the
person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity
to know what is prohibited, so that he may act
accordingly.
Vague laws may trap the innocent by not
providing fair warning."
Second, if arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must
provide explicit standards for those who apply them. []
A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters
to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad
hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of
arbitrary and discriminatory application." Third, but
related, where a vague statute "abut[s] upon sensitive
areas of basic First Amendment freedoms, "[] it "operates
to
inhibit
the
exercise
of
[those]
freedoms.""
Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to "'steer
far wider of the unlawful zone'
. . . than if the
boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked.""
Gravned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294,
, 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 227-28

(1972) (footnotes omitted); see also

Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855,

, 75

L.Ed.2d 903, 909 (1983); Greenwood v. City of N. Salt Lake. 817
P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1991).
Section 76-3-203.1(1)(b) provides that "'In concert with
two or more persons' as used

in this section means that

the

defendant and two or more other persons would be criminally liable
for the offense as parties under Section 76-2-202."
clear what the defendant's mental state must be.

It is far from

Section 76-2-202

provides:
Every person, acting with the mental state
required for the commission of an offense who directly
commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands,
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to
engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be
criminally liable as a party for such conduct.
While on its face this section does not seem to require that the
defendant have any intent

to engage in the conduct in concert with
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others, as a matter of due process the State should not subject an
individual

to harsher punishment

others.

Some

element

of

based

intent,

on the random

knowledge,

or

acts of
at

least

acquiescence in the aid of others must be required, although the
statute fails to make this clear.
The statute likewise does not specify the nature of its
true intent.

The statute was enacted to combat the criminal street

gang problem in Utah, yet fails to recognize, identify, or define
the problem at all.
(outlining

Compare Cal. Penal Code §186.20 et seq.

legislative

goals

(§186.21),

defining

"pattern

of

criminal gang activity" (§186.22(e), and defining "criminal street
gang"

(§186.22(f))).

California

courts

statute

have

in

relied

rejecting

on

the

specificity

of

challenges.

In re Alberto R. , 235 Cal. App. 3d 1309, 1 Cal. Rptr.

2d 348

the

California

vagueness

(1991); People v. Gamez, 235 Cal. App. 3d 957, 286 Cal.

Rptr. 8 94 (1991).

The language of the statute here is vague, and

fails to convey the statute's true intent.
The Supreme Court has explained that the most critical
aspect

of

legislatures

the

vagueness

provide

doctrine

sufficient

is

the

guidelines

requirement
concerning

application of a penal statute:
Although the doctrine focuses both on actual notice to
citizens and arbitrary enforcement, we have recognized
recently that the more important aspect of the vagueness
doctrine "is not actual notice, but the other principal
element of the doctrine -- the requirement that a
legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law
enforcement." Smith [v. Goguen] , 415 U.S. [566,] 574, 94
S.Ct. 1242, 39 L.Ed.2d 605 [(1974)].
Where the
legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a
criminal statute may permit "a standardless sweep [that]
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that
the

allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their
personal predilections." Id., at 575.
Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357-58 (footnote omitted).
The primary failing of the gang enhancement statute is
its

complete

application.

failure

to

set

guidelines

Section 76-3-203.1

concerning

its

proper

impermissibly delegates basic

policy matters to judges for resolution on an ad hoc basis, as
reflected in the legislative history and the text of the statute.
Judges

are

expected

to

use

their

discretion

in

determining whether Section 76-3-203.1 applies, as reflected in
Rep. Rushton's statements in the legislative history:
[T] he sentencing judge, rather than the jury, shall
decide whether to impose the penalty. We are not going
to make any effort to take the judicial discretion out of
this penalty phase. It will give the judge the right, if
he feels that an individual needs to be taken out of that
situation for this enhanced period of time, the judge
still has the discretion to either take him out for an
enhanced period of time or . . . not.
Legislative history at 3 . In response to questions concerning the
broad language of the statute, and whether persons who are not
gangmembers could be convicted under the statute of "essentially
gang activities", Rep. Rushton assured legislators that judges
could be trusted to apply the statute in only the limited, gangrelated circumstances intended.

Id.

While the statute does in fact grant judges discretion to
suspend application of the enhancement, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3203.1(6), it utterly fails to constrain or guide that discretion in
any fashion.
Justice Howe has described the hazards of such a statute:
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It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could
set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders,
and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who
could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at
large.
This would, to some extent, substitute the
judicial
for
the
legislative
department
of
the
government.
State v. Blowers, 717 P.2d

1321, 1324

(Utah 1986)

(Howe,

J.,

concurring) (quoting U.S. v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221, 23 L.Ed. 563
(1875)).

Section 76-3-203.1 casts a large net and sweeps too

broadly, without appropriate guidelines for the judges who are
called upon

to impose

the enhancement.

The gang

enhancement

statute should be declared void for vagueness.
POINT V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE
MR. LELEAE THE BENEFIT OF A LESS SEVERE 0-5
YEAR SENTENCE FOR CONSPIRACY IN LIEU OF AN
ENHANCED MINIMUM TERM OF 6 YEARS UNDER THE
SHONDEL DOCTRINE.
In State v.

Shondel, 453

P.2d

146

(Utah 1969),

the

Supreme Court held that where two statutes proscribe the same
conduct, the lesser penalty applies.

The identical "in concert"

conduct at issue here is proscribed by two statutes.

Utah Code

Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1995) applies an enhanced 6 year minimum term to
second degree felonies committed under it.
202(3)

Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-

(Supp. 1998) provides that conspiracy to commit a second

degree felony is a third degree felony.
The
applicable

same

conduct

that

makes

the

gang

enhancement

also renders one guilty of conspiracy.

Conspiracy

requires that a person, "intending that conduct constituting a
crime be performed, agrees with one or more persons to engage in or
cause the performance of such conduct and any one of them commits
48

an overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy."
4-2 01.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-

Here, the facts as found by the jury and judge indicate

that one or more persons (the two Seumanu brothers) intended that
the crime be committed, all three acted in concert to commit the
crime, and an overt act
occurred.

(indeed, accomplishment of the crime)

Under Shondel, Mr. Leleae is entitled to the lesser

penalty prescribed for conspiracy to commit aggravated assault.
Under the Sentencing Guidelines in effect at the time of
Mr. Leleae 1 s March 9, 1998 sentencing (see addendum E ) , the board
of pardons would impose upon a person convicted of a second degree
felony person crime a presumptive minimum sentence of 18, 21, 24,
30, or 3 6 months, depending on criminal history assessment.

A

third degree felony person crime enhancement would be 6 months if
concurrent, or 12 months if consecutive.
the

fair

minimum

criminal

sentence

of

history

category,

3 0 months.

Mr. Leleae was placed in
indicating

a

With a concurrent

presumptive
conspiracy

sentence, his minimum sentence would be 3 years; a consecutive
conspiracy sentence would make his sentence 3M years.

Even in the

worst case scenario of a person in the poor criminal history, the
offender would receive a presumptive minimum sentence of 4 8 months
if a consecutive conspiracy sentence was added.

This is two years

shorter than the minimum 6 year sentence provided under the gang
enhancement.6

Instead of a minimum

6

sentence of

6 years, due

Under the new Sentencing Guidelines effective October 15,
1998 (see addendum F) , a similar result pertains. Mr. Leleae would
be in criminal history category IV. A second degree felony person
crime provides a presumptive total sentence of 48 months.
A
(continued...)
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process and the Shondel doctrine mandate that Mr. Leleae receive
instead a 0-5 year sentence as set forth by the conspiracy statute.
CONCLUSION
Based on the forgoing, Mr. Leleae respectfully requests
that his conviction be reversed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

,,
/ /

day of January, 1999.

/)

ROBERT K. HEINEMAN
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

LISA J. REMAL
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

6

(...continued)
concurrent conspiracy sentence would add 10% of 3 0 months, or 3
months.
A consecutive conspiracy sentence would add 40% of 30
months, or 12 months. His sentence would be either 51 months (if
concurrent) or 60 months (if consecutive), still shorter than the
6 year (72 month) minimum term under the gang enhancement.
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ADDENDUM A
Statutes, Rules, and Constitutional Provisions

The

fourteenth

amendment

to

the

United

States

Constitution provides:
Section 1. [Citizenship —
protection.]

Due process of law —

Equal

All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of las; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of laws.

Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides:
Sec. 7.

[Due process of law.]

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.

Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides:
Sec. 12.

[Rights of accused persons.]

In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have
the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel,
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to
have compulsory process to compel the attendance of
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall
any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled
to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled
to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his
wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for
the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a
preliminary examination, the function of that examination
is limited to determining whether probable cause exists
unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this
constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay

evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in
part at any preliminary examination to determine probable
cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to
release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is
allowed as defined by statute or rule.

Article I, section 13 of the Utah Constitution provides:
Sec. 13.
[Prosecution by information or indictment
Grand jury.]

—

Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted
by indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after
examination and commitment by a magistrate, unless the
examination be waived by the accused with the consent of
the State, or by indictment, with or without such
examination and commitment. The formation of the grand
jury and the powers and duties thereof shall be as
prescribed by the Legislature.

Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution provides:
Sec. 24.

[Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform

operation.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (Supp. 1998) provides:
§ 76-1-601. Definitions.
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms
apply to this title:
(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain,
illness, or any impairment of physical condition.
(10) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily
injury that creates or causes serious permanent
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a
substantial risk of death.
(11) "Substantial bodily injury" means bodily
injury, not amounting to serious bodily injury, that
creates or causes protracted physical pain, temporary
disfigurement, or temporary loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily member or organ.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (Supp. 1998) provides:
§ 76-5-102. Assault.
(1) Assault is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or
violence, to do bodily injury to another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of
immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to
another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force
or violence, that causes or creates a substantial
risk of bodily injury to another.
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor.
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if the
person causes substantial bodily injury to another.
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that
the accused caused serious bodily injury to another.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103

(Supp. 1998) provides:

§ 76-5-103. Aggravated assault.
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he
commits assault as defined in Section 76-5-102 and he:
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily
injury to another; or
(b) under circumstances not amounting to
a violation of Subsection (1)(a), uses a dangerous
weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other
means or force likely to produce death or serious
bodily injury.
(2) A violation of Subsection (1) (a) is a
second degree felony.
(3) A violation of Subsection (1) (b) is a third
degree felony.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202

(1995) provides:

76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct
commission of offense or for conduct of another.
Every person, acting with the mental state
required for the commission of an offense who directly
commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands,
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to
engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be
criminally liable as a party for such conduct.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1

(1995) provides:

76-3-203.1. Offenses conunitted by three or more persons
— Enhanced penalties.
(1)
(a) A person who commits any offense listed
in Subsection (4) in concert with two or more
persons is subject to an enhanced penalty for
the offense as provided below.
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as
used in this section means the defendant and
two or more other persons would be criminally
liable for the offense as parties under Section
76-2-202.
(2)
(a) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury
if an indictment is returned, shall cause to be
subscribed upon the complaint in misdemeanor
cases or the information or indictment in
felony cases notice that the defendant is
subject to the enhanced penalties provided
under this section. The notice shall be in a
clause separate from and in addition to the
substantive offense charged.
(b) If the subscription is not included
initially, the court may subsequently allow the
prosecutor to amend the charging document to
include the subscription if the court finds the
charging documents, including any statement of
probable cause, provide notice to the defendant
of the allegation he committed the offense in
concert with two or more persons, or if the
court finds the defendant has not otherwise
been substantially prejudiced by the omission.
(3) The enhanced penalties for offenses committed
under this section are:
(a) If the offense is a class B misdemeanor,
the convicted person shall serve a minimum term
of 90 consecutive days in a jail or other
secure correctional facility.
(b) If the offense is a class A misdemeanor,
the convicted person shall serve a minimum term
of 180 consecutive days in a jail or other
secure correctional facility.
(c) If the offense is a third degree felony,
the convicted person shall be sentenced to an
enhanced minimum term of three years in prison.
(d) If the offense is a second degree felony,
the convicted person shall be sentenced to an
enhanced minimum term of six years in prison.
(e) If the offense is a first degree felony,
the convicted person shall be sentenced to an
enhanced minimum term of nine years in prison.
(f) If the offense is a capital offense for
which a life sentence is imposed, the convicted

person shall be sentenced to a minimum term of
20 years in prison.
(4) Offenses referred to in Subsection (1) are:
(a) any criminal violation of Title 58,
Chapter 37, 3 7a, 3 7b, or 3 7c, regarding
drug-related offenses;
(b) assault and related offenses under Title
76, Chapter 5, Part 1;
(c) any criminal homicide offense under Title
76, Chapter 5, Part 2;
(d) kidnapping and related offenses under
Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 3;
(e) any felony sexual offense under Title 76,
Chapter 5, Part 4;
(f) sexual exploitation of a minor as defined
in Section 76-5a-3;
(g) any property destruction offense under
Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 1;
(h) burglary, criminal trespass, and related
offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 2;
(i) robbery and aggravated robbery under
Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 3;
(j) theft and related offenses under Title
76, Chapter 6, Part 4;
(k) any fraud offense under Title 76, Chapter
6, Part 5, except Sections 76-6-503, 76-6-504,
76-6-505, 76-6-507, 76-6-508, 76-6-509,
76-6-510, 76-6-511, 76-6-512, 76-6-513,
76-6-514, 76-6-516, 76-6-517, 76-6-518, and
76-6-520;
(1) any offense of obstructing government
operations under Part 3, Title 76, Chapter 8,
except Sections 76-8-302, 76-8-303, 76-8-304,
76-8-307, 76-8-308, and 76-8-312;
(m) tampering with a witness or other
violation of Section 76-8-508;
(n) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal
proceeding as defined in Section 76-8-509;
(o) any explosives offense under Title 76,
Chapter 10, Part 3;
(p) any weapons offense under Title 76,
Chapter 10, Part 5;
(q) pornographic and harmful materials and
performances offenses under Title 76, Chapter
10, Part 12;
(r) prostitution and related offenses under
Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 13;
(s) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10,
Part 15, Bus Passenger Safety Act;
(t) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10,
Part 16, Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act;
(u) communications fraud as defined in
Section 76-10-1801;

(v) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10,
Part 19, Money Laundering and Currency
Transaction Reporting Act; and
(w) burglary of a research facility as
defined in Section 76-10-2002.
(5)
(a) This section does not create any
separate offense but provides an enhanced
penalty for the primary offense.
(b) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced
penalties under this section that the persons
with whom the actor is alleged to have acted in
concert are not identified, apprehended,
charged, or convicted, or that any of those
persons are charged with or convicted of a
different or lesser offense.
(c) The sentencing judge rather than the jury
shall decide whether to impose the enhanced
penalty under this section. The imposition of
the penalty is contingent upon a finding by the
sentencing judge that this section is
applicable. In conjunction with sentencing the
court shall enter written findings of fact
concerning the applicability of this section.
(6) The court may suspend the imposition or
execution of the sentence required under this section
if the court:
(a) finds that the interests of justice would
be best served; and
(b) states the specific circumstances
justifying the disposition on the record and in
writing.

Rule 106, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides:
Rule 106. Remainder of or related writings or recorded
statements.
When a writing or recorded statement or part
thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may
require the introduction at that time of any other part
or any other writing or recorded statement which ought
in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it.

Rule 611(a), Utah Rules of Evidence, provides:

Rule 611. Mode and order of interrogation and presentation.
(a) Control by Court. The court shall exercise
reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating
witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the
interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of

the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3)
protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.
(b) Scope of Cross-Examination.
Cross-examination
should be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination
and matters affecting the credibility of the witness. The court
may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into
additional matters as if on direct examination.
(c) Leading Questions. Leading questions should not be
used on the direct examination of a witness except as may be
necessary to develop the witness 1 testimony. Ordinarily leading
questions should be permitted on cross-examination. When a party
calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness
identified with an adverse party, interrogation may be by leading
questions.

Rule 18, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides:
Rule 18. Selection of jury.
(a) The clerk shall draw by lot and call the
number of the jurors that are to try the cause plus
such an additional number as will allow for all
peremptory challenges permitted. After each challenge
for cause sustained, another juror shall be called to
fill the vacancy before further challenges are made,
and any such new juror may be challenged for cause.
When the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk
shall make a list of the jurors remaining, and each
side, beginning with the prosecution, shall indicate
thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at a time
in regular turn, as the court may direct, until all
peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived.
The
clerk shall then call the remaining jurors, or so many
of them as shall be necessary to constitute the jury,
in the order in which they appear on the list, and the
persons whose names are so called shall constitute the
jury.
(b) The court may permit counsel or the
defendant to conduct the examination of the prospective
jurors or may itself conduct the examination.
In the
latter event, the court may permit counsel or the
defendant to supplement the examination by such further
inquiry as it deems proper, or may itself submit to the
prospective jurors additional questions requested by
counsel or the defendant.
(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or
to an individual juror.
(1) The panel is a list of jurors called
to serve at a particular court or for the trial of
a particular action. A challenge to the panel is
an objection made to all jurors summoned and may
be taken by either party.

(i) A challenge to the panel can be
founded only on a material departure from the
procedure prescribed with respect to the
selection, drawing, summoning and return of
the panel.
(ii) The challenge to the panel
shall be taken before the jury is sworn and
shall be in writing or recorded by the
reporter. It shall specifically set forth
the facts constituting the grounds of the
challenge.
(iii) If a challenge to the panel
is opposed by the adverse party, a hearing
may be had to try any question of fact upon
which the challenge is based. The jurors
challenged, and any other persons, may be
called as witnesses at the hearing thereon.
(iv) The court shall decide the
challenge. If the challenge to the panel is
allowed, the court shall discharge the jury
so far as the trial in question is concerned.
If a challenge is denied, the court shall
direct the selection of jurors to proceed.
(2) A challenge to an individual juror
may be either peremptory or for cause. A
challenge to an individual juror may be made only
before the jury is sworn to try the action, except
the court may, for good cause, permit it to be
made after the juror is sworn but before any of
the evidence is presented. In challenges for
cause the rules relating to challenges to a panel
and hearings thereon shall apply. All challenges
for cause shall be taken first by the prosecution
and then by the defense.
(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection to
a juror for which no reason need be given. In capital
cases, each side is entitled to 10 peremptory
challenges.
In other felony cases each side is
entitled to four peremptory challenges. In misdemeanor
cases, each side is entitled to three peremptory
challenges.
If there is more than one defendant the
court may allow the defendants additional peremptory
challenges and permit them to be exercised separately
or jointly.
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection
to a particular juror and may be taken on one or more
of the following grounds:
(1) want of any of the qualifications
prescribed by law;
(2) any mental or physical infirmity
which renders one incapable of performing the
duties of a juror;
(3) consanguinity or affinity within the
fourth degree to the person alleged to be injured

by the offense charged, or on whose complaint the
prosecution was instituted;
(4) the existence of any social, legal,
business, fiduciary or other relationship between
the prospective juror and any party, witness or
person alleged to have been victimized or injured
by the defendant, which relationship when viewed
objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds
that the prospective juror would be unable or
unwilling to return a verdict which would be free
of favoritism. A prospective juror shall not be
disqualified solely because he is indebted to or
employed by the state or a political subdivision
thereof;
(5) having been or being the party
adverse to the defendant in a civil action, or
having complained against or having been accused
by him in a criminal prosecution;
(6) having served on the grand jury
which found the indictment;
(7) having served on a trial jury which
has tried another person for the particular
offense charged;
(8) having been one of a jury formally
sworn to try the same charge, and whose verdict
was set aside, or which was discharged without a
verdict after the case was submitted to it;
(9) having served as a juror in a civil
action brought against the defendant for the act
charged as an offense;
(10) if the offense charged is punishable
with death, the entertaining of such conscientious
opinions about the death penalty as would preclude the
juror from voting to impose the death penalty following
conviction regardless of the facts;
(11) because he is or, within one year
preceding, has been engaged or interested in
carrying on any business, calling or employment,
the carrying on of which is a violation of law,
where defendant is charged with a like offense;
(12) because he has been a witness,
either for or against the defendant on the
preliminary examination or before the grand jury;
(13) having formed or expressed an
unqualified opinion or belief as to whether the
defendant is guilty or not guilty of the offense
charged;
or
(14) that a state of mind exists on the
part of the juror with reference to the cause, or
to either party, which will prevent him from
acting impartially and without prejudice to the
substantial rights of the party challenging;
but
no person shall be disqualified as a juror by
reason of having formed or expressed an opinion

upon the matter or cause to be submitted to such
jury, founded upon public rumor, statements in
public journals or common notoriety, if it
satisfactorily appears to the court that the juror
can and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act
impartially and fairly upon the matter to be
submitted to him.
(f) Peremptory challenges shall be taken
first by the prosecution and then by the defense
alternately. Challenges for cause shall be completed
before peremptory challenges are taken.
(g) The court may direct that alternate
jurors be impanelled. Alternate jurors, in the order
in which they are called, shall replace jurors who are,
or become, unable or disqualified to perform their
duties. The prosecution and defense shall each have
one additional peremptory challenge for each alternate
juror to be chosen.
Alternate jurors shall have the same
qualifications, take the same oath and enjoy the same
privileges as regular jurors.
(h) A statutory exemption from service as a
juror is a privilege of the person exempted and is not
a ground for challenge for cause.
(i) When the jury is selected an oath shall
be administered to the jurors, in substance, that they
and each of them will well and truly try the matter in
issue between the parties, and render a true verdict
according to the evidence and the instructions of the
court.

ADDENDUM B
Portion of Mr. Leleae's statement, R. 4 02:30-31

YOU KNOW WHAT, YOU TELL THE TRUTH, YOU DOIN SOMETHING YOU
DON'T FEEL LIKE DOING, LIKE THIS SITUATION WHEN I WAS DRIVING
AND YOU KNOW SOMETHING IS WRONG BUT YOU CAN'T DO NOTHING
ABOUT IT BECAUSE YOU IN IT ALREADY, YOU KNOW. THAT'S THE ONLY
FEELING THAT WAS HITTING ME WHEN THEY WERE BEATING UP THE
MAN, YOU KNOW, WHEN I SEE THE TWO OF THEM GOING AT IT
BEATING UP A MAN NOT EVEN A MAN JUST ANOTHER PERSON TOO,
ANOTHER WHITE MANE WITH LONG HAIR, IT WASN'T REALLY HARD
FOR ME TO TRY TO HOLD THEM BACK BECAUSE THEY ARE MY FRIENDS
AND WHEN THEY BEAT THE MAN DOWN, YOU KNOW, WHAT MY
FEELINGS WAS, YOU KNOW, SHOULD I HELP THEM BEAT UP THE MAN
OR SHOULD I JUST STAND HERE, I DIDN'T WANT TO BE A PUNK AND
JUST STAND THERE AND NOT DOING NOTHING AND THAT WAS THE
ONLY THING ON MY MIND. D71 WASN'T THE ONE THAT WAS SHOOTING,
I WASN'T THE ONE DRIVING, I WOULD PROBABLY OF BEAT THE MAN. I
KNOW SINCE I TELL THE TRUTH, THAT EVERYBODY OVER THERE THAT
SEEING THE THING, THE WITNESSES THAT WERE OVER THERE THAT
WOULD RECOGNIZE ME FROM WHEN THEY WERE BEATING UP THE
MAN, THEY KNOW THAT I WASN'T LAYING A HAND ON NOBODY THAT I
WAS TRYING TO HOLD MY BOY BACK, THE BIG ONE, THE ONE OWNED
THE CAR. THIS WAS ENOUGH YOU KNOW OTHER PEOPLE AROUND. I
KNOW THAT I WAS DRUNK YOU KNOW. BUT THEN AGAIN I KNOW
-30-

WHAT I WAS DOING.
WELL I APPRECIATE YOU TELLING US THE TRUTH. IT MAKES IT
EASIER TO FIGURE THINGS OUT BECAUSE THINGS JUST WEREN'T
FITTING TOGETHER. JOHN AT THIS TIME, WE ARE GOING TO GO BACK
AND TALK TO ONE OF THE OTHER GUYS TO SEE IF HE WILL COME
CLEAN AND TALK TO US. WE ARE GOING TO PUT YOU BACK INTO THE
ROOM FOR A FEW MINUTES AND THEN WE WILL LET YOU KNOW WHAT
WE ARE GOING TO DO. O.K.?
THIS WILL CONCLUDE THIS INTERVIEW THE TIME IS 0252 HOURS.
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ADDENDUM C
Judgment, Sentence and Commitment, R. 351-2

3rd DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
INCOURT NOTE

vs.

Case No: 971900804 FS
Judge:
Date:

JOHN LELEAE,
Defendant.

TYRONE E. MEDLEY
March 9, 1998

PRESENT
Prosecutor: CY H CASTLE
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): LISA J. REMAL
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: October 27, 1972
Cleric:
daleeng
Reporter: DOROTHY TRIPP
CHARGES
2. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT - 2nd Degree Felony
- Disposition: 12/01/1997 {Guilty - Jury}
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE
Defendant to receive credit for time served.
Page 1

Restitution ordered

Case No: 971900804
Date:
Mar 09, 1998
in the amounts of $446.00 and $300.00.
SENTENCING ENHANCEMENT
Due to being gang related, an enhancement of severity on charge 1
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT is enhanced from 2nd Degree Felony to 2nd Degree
Felony. Additional time sentenced is 6 years.
Dated this

/

day of

^)%dSt*^^

^W

<

f^.

(TYRONE E. MEDLEY
,y
District Court Judge

Page 2 (last)
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ADDENDUM D
Gang Enhancement legislative history

LEGISLATIVE INTENT IN SENATE BILL 52/ OTAH CODE ANNOTATED
76-3-203.1/ THE PENALTY ENHANCEMENT POR OFFENSES COMMITTED BY THREE
OR MORE PERSONS*

Legislative History:
Senate Bill 52, currently found in Utah Code Ann* section
76-3-203.1/ and referred to in L. 1990/ ch. 207 section 1/ was
passed on February 21, 1990, approved on March 12, 1990, and became
effective on April 23, 1990•
The Office of Legislative Counsel to the Utah Legislature
has no committee reports concerning this legislation. The only
evidence of legislative intent to be found outside the statute
itself is the taped and transcribed floor debates in the house and
the senate. Tapes are available at the respective offices in the
Utah State Capitol.

Bouse Floor debates on Senate Bill 52
February 21/ 1990
Speaker of the House:
Who's the sponsor of Senate Bill 52?
Rushton.

Representative

Representative Rushton:
Ah/ this is kind of a surprise that it come up so fast this
morning, ah, Senate Bill 52 is what's ended up after a lot
of research this summer on the street gang problems, mostly
in the Salt Lake County, some in Davis and Utah County.
Ah, I'm sure most counties that have any town size at all
will have ... be affected by the street gangs that are
coming into Utah. There's several reasons why there's such
a giant influx of criminal street gangs in Utah. The main
reason is the price differential of crack cocaine. Ah, in
Los Angeles, crack cocaine is in a surplus or a buyer's
market. It can be bought between three and four hundred
dollars an ounce. That same crack cocaine will sell in
Salt Lake for somewhere around twenty four hundred dollars
an ounce in some rural cities in Utah we'll get as much as
three hundred ...er three thousand dollars an ounce. This
price differential has brought about a phenomenon with the
Los Angeles street gangs that's called franchising. The
reason it's called franchising, it isn't a whole lot
different than McDonald's. They franchise out. We've
always had local street gangs in Utah. They've been
involved in petty crime, a social service nuisance, anyone
who lives in this metropolitan area is familiar with them,
the graffiti/ ahr when I was a boy thirty five years agof

there were street gangs in salt Lake City. Ah, but they
they weren't the serious problem chat they are becoming now
with the introduction of crack cocaine* Ah, police
departments estimate that in the Salt Lake valley now there
are six hundred plus members, identifiable members of these
California style street gangs, of that six hundred, it is
estimated that a hardened criminal core of the gangs,
generally young adults — the gangs consist of youths all
the way from nine, and I call them youths, nine to twenty
five, thirty years old. The young adults that belong to
this gang are, these gangs, it is estimated about three
percent of this group are hardened criminals with
associations with the street gangs in Los Angeles. When I
became aware of the existence of Los Angeles type gangs in
existence in my own neighborhood in Hagna, and West Valley,
I become quite alarmed. It's a scary thought when we know
what happened to the Bronx in Hew York in the sixties
because of street gangs. Three hundred and seventy
something acres of the Bronx had to be literally given up
from the law enforcement and levelled* One of the most
vivid pictures of the street gang history in New York City,
er, the Bronx in New rork was three hundred and seventy
acres of what was once communities, towns, neighborhoods,
as they call them in New York, and those buildings were
bulldozed down, every last one of them, because of the
situation that arose out of the Bronx street gangs in the
fifties and sixties. Right now there are large areas of
Los Angeles where law enforcement has given up. They have
been bulldozed down. I don't think that situation will
ever come to Salt Lake or to Ogden, Clearfield, where the
street gangs are trenched right now, but elements of that
environment have came to Salt Lake. Ah, Senator Fordham
and myself become alarmed about this in about July of last
year. We inquired of the Los Angeles County Attorney's
Office on what was being done to prevent street gangs in
there, they told us about a piece of legislation in
California called "The Street Terrorism Prevention Act."
We brought a copy of that act to Otah, we got a lot of
literature about it, and we had a bill written up that
patterned the Street Terrorism Act* But since that time,
that act has run into constitutional problems in
California, so we had representatives from SWAP, do a lot
of research on it, and they came up, the Statewide
Association of Prosecuting Attorneys, in conjunction with
the Chief Police Association, came up with this bill, the
croQp criminal activities penalty, which they feel
confident avoids the constitutional problems of the
California Street Terrorism Act and will be a useful tool.
It doesn't have the political or the psychological effects
that our original Street Terrorism had, because we used the
term gang, we used the term street terrorism in our bill,
and they told us this was the reason why it would become
constitutionally unsound. So, if you read the bill it will
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not have the word "street gang" in it, in order to make it
so we're not, the constitutional problem comes with
labelling people by name. It isf looks benign, "Group
Criminal Activities Penalty," but this is in fact what the
Statewide of Prosecuting Attorneys have asked for and want
for tools to be used against street gang prolification
[sic] in the state of Utah. Ah, I can go through the act,
ah, but the main parts of the act at first is it provides
an enhanced penalty for group criminal activities, and that
is supplied on line twenty four of first page, "if crimes
are committed in concert of two or more persons" used in
this second, the second page describes the enhanced
penalties, ah, the idea behind the enhanced penalties in
California and the idea here was to get that center core,
that's the core group of hardened criminals that supplies
the money, supplies the impetus for a true .criminal street
gang. We've got to differentiate that between a street
gang and a criminal street gang - it's a different world
altogether. Ah, it gets to the hardened core, and the
social workers tell us that the only thing to do with them
to allow social workers to work with the remainder of the
young people at risk in these gangs is to get that hardened
core off the streets. The enhanced penalty is designed for
that purpose. Ah, so the second page deals with the
enhanced penalties. The third page is a list of crimes
that are effected by this bill and an important aspect of
this bill that I hope will placate those that are worried
about enhanced penalties, across this, I see John look at
me right in the eyes. Because John and I have agreed on a
lot of things and both of agree that enhanced penalties are
something that has to be proven that there's a need for
before you talk about it because a lot of enhanced
penalties don't do anything more than create problems for
the corrections. But this enhanced penalty, we have got to
get that hard core of the street gang groups off of the
streets, out of the street gangs. Ah, to soften the
enhanced penalty, if you'll notice on the last page, page
five of the bill, ah, the sentencing judge, rather than the
jury, shall decide whether to impose the penalty. We are
not going to make any effort to take the judicial
discretion out of this penalty phase. It will give the
judge the right, if he feels that that individual ne^ds to
be taken out of that situation for this enhanced period of
time, the judge still has the discretion to either take him
out for an enhanced period of time or - him, I shouldn't
use hi~m - take this person out for enhanced period of time
or not. Ah, I think that the bill is self explanatory and
thac it does have the support of the Statewide Police Chief
Association and the Statewide Prosecuting Attorneys
Association, ah, the bill came from them as an answer to a
problem that we brought to them. And I'd stand to ask,
answer, any questions, ah, ...
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Speaker of the House:
Representatives to the bill. Representative Millner?
Representative Millner:
Thank you, Mr. Speaker. First of all, I'd like to declare
a conflict because I am a member of a street gang. I
thought I'd get your attention with that. Urn, I happen to
have a group of young children in my neighborhood who are
the siblings of members of street gangs. And, ah, in
trying to perhaps dissuade them from criminal activities,
we've formulated our own street gang, and of course our
intents and purposes are perhaps to be, urn, good for the
neighborhood, and urn, ah, we tried to take on little
projects for that. But, I stand in support of this bill,
but I do want to kind of state some concerns that I have,
and that it that many times we have failed in our society
to address in the concerns of our youth, which lead to
juvenile street gangs, and I feel that many young people
who come from broken homes and who don't have the
environmental supports, or perhaps church support systems,
kind of fall between the cracks. And so we have a
responsibility, each one of us, if we see these young
people, who get caught up in criminal activities, to try
and become their friends and encourage them to get out of
that kind of activity and lead them light, and so I stand
in support of this bill, but I also want to send a
message. And that message is that we need to provide
opportunities for these young people, educational
opportunities and employment for those who particularly get
involved in juvenile crimes, and ah, so they don't get into
drugs and other activities. And so I support the bill,
thank you.
Speaker of the House:
Representative Hales?
Representative Hales:
Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I would like to speak in support
of this very important legislation. I have a good citizen
in my district who is in the business of coin operated game
machines. Ah, he operates in several states, Otah is one
of these, and he said in the past three or four months,
these gang groups have cost him, as well as the stores, ah,
Shopko, Smith's Pood Xing, as much as thirty thousand
dollars in just a very short period of time. But be said
in addition to the theft, and the property damage that has
occurred, be has been really concerned about the
aggressiveness of these groups. He said that very often
-these thefts occur during the time that the stores are
open, sometimes at night when there's one night clerk on,
they intimidate the night clerk. And as I became aware of
this problem, and have visited with more people, I don't
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think we're really talking about these neighborhood
children that Representative Hillner has talked about,
although it could be. Ah, they say that these groups are
sophisticated enough that they know what the state lavs
are, and very often they will move around according to what
the state law is that handles this kind of theft and this
kind of aggression and property damage. So I urge your
support of this legislation. I think it's really important
and I have ay hat off to those who've, a Senator Fordham
and those who have brought this to our attention. Thank
you.
Speaker of the House:
Representative, ah, Tuttie?
Representative Tuttie:
Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I stand in support of this bill
also. In the Magna times issue this summer, there was an
article and pictures about the grafitti that was put in the
buildings in Magna by different groups that are either
copycatting the groups in California or members, and I
think it's well needed and I think we should support this.
Thank you.
Speaker of the House:
Representative Bush?
Representative Bush:
Oops. Thank you Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this .
bill and I would ... Representative...sorry, Representative
Rushton and Senator Fordham for looking into this. There's
no sensB waiting until our state becomes like some of these
other areas of the country before we start doing something
about it. I don't have any special horror stories to tell,
but ah, this, I think this is one of the most important
pieces of legislation we've had, and I commend them for it
and ask you to support it.
Speaker of the House:
Representative Prante?
Representative Prante:
Thank you, Mr. Speaker, will the sponsor yield to a
question?
Representative Rushton:
Teah.
Speaker of the House:
Sponsor yields, proceed.

S

Representative Prante:
He's sitting right next to me, but I just want this
clarified for myself. It's bard to ask him when he's on
the microphone. Ah, the question I have is I'm all for
what the bill's doing, but the question I have and perhaps,
ah, Representative Rushton can respond to it, is that when
it refers to that a person commits a — two or more people
committing a crime, and ah, such crimes as burglary and
criminal trespass being those kind of crimes, I'm wondering
if anytime two people, especially young people who haven't
learned, maybe are yielding to impulse sometimes, and
aren't members of actual gangs, how does it impact on them?
Representative Rushton:
The answer to these question probably would be better
answered by a lawyer than by me, but I'm told that it is
contained in the following paragraph when it talks about
the concert action of two or more persons. Ah, it's also
will fall, the problem that be talks about if if just two
people commit burglary together does this constitute group
criminal activities? Or three people it would have to be.
You got the two people and the individual, the individual
who does this in concern with two other people. Ah, I
think that the best cover here is in the judicial
discretion that's allowed in the last page. Ah, and the
definition of concert action between these people • a legal
definition.
Representative Prante:
Where's the definition?
Representative Rushton:
Ah, it's in section 76-2-202. Yeah, well, that's the
judicial.
Representative Prante:
Maybe you could just read the section that's applicable to
this, Representative, that shows the court's discretion?
Representative Rushton:
I don't have my book with me.
Representative Prante:
Oh. Okay-* Maybe ah, an attorney can comment on this. My
concern isn't with what itfs doing, it's with, what if two
people .steal apples off a tree? Or what if two people
impossibly/ impulsively take something from a home, are
they suddenly convicted of essentially gang activities? ...
Ah, I see there is the court discretion in it. Okay, thank
you.
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Representative Rushton:
Yeah, that's what I was saying, that, thank you.
Speaker of the House:
Representative Fuller?
Representative Fuller:
Thank you, Mr. Speaker.

Call for a previous question?

Speaker of the House:
Previous question has been called. All in favor of the
previous question say "Aye"? Opposed "no1? Motion
carries. Representative Rushton", you may sum up.
Representative Rushton:
Z could talk all night on gang problems in my neighborhood
and all I have to say is when you see a young person with
the blue skull cap of the California Crips 'gang in your
neighborhood, if you're not scared, you don't understand
what's going on. And ah, this law is directed at the core,
it's not directed, as Joann has expressed, kids that are at
risk, you see them wearing the gang signs, their ball cap
turned around backwards on the West, or they sign each
other with finger signs like this as they go by. Each gang
has its own finger sign. Ah, these people that are at
risk, and these are kids at risk. This bill is directed ac
that core criminal element, that three percent of those six
hundred gang members that have been identified that provide
the father figure in these gangs. And they provide also
the connection the California gangs, the connection to the
crack cocaine, the money that is fueling this explosion of
gang activity in our cities and I'd like to ask you for
your support for this bill and thank you for your time.
Speaker of the House:
Voting's open on Senate Bill 52. ... It appears to the
chair that all present have voted. Voting is closed on
Senate Bill 52. Senate Bill 52 has received SI affirmative
and no negative votes gasses this House.
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Senate Floor debates on Senate Bill 52
January 23 and 24, 1990
January 23, 1990
Senator Fordham:
Ah# Mr. President and fellow Senators, this is an important
bill. Ah, we've worked on this bill since the middle of
the summer/ worked with the Attorney General's Office, with
prosecuting attorneys in this state, with other divisions
of enforcement in this state. Originally/ we had a bill
called the "Organization Gang Bill." In ah working with
California, who this bill was patterned after, their bill,
and after they passed their law, we bad an influx of gang
members coming from California and infiltrating into Otab
and establishing residence here and working as ab in their
organization as members of, who had broken off from the
California gangs. I think we need to send a message to
these organized people that there isn't a place for them in
Utah. Now we've bad, in working with California, their
problem was that it was so difficult to prove that a
individual was a member of an organized gang. We changed
our bill to read "Group Criminal Activity" and it involves
when two or more commit a crime, then they're subject to
the penalties that are made in this law. And ab let me
just read what, quickly if I can, a class B misdemeanor,
the individual shall serve a minimum of ninety consecutive
days in the jail. If the offense is a class A misdemeanor,
the convicted person shall serve a minimum term of a
hundred and eighty consecutive days. If the offense is a
third degree felony the convicted person shall be sentenced
to an enhanced minimum term of three years in prison. If
the offense is a second degree felony, the convicted person
shall be sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of six years
in prison. And if the. offense is a first degree felony,
the person shall be sentenced to an enhanced minimum term
of nine years in prison. We felt that we need to make very
restrictrive [sic], and these, ab these charges would be
administered and sentenced by the judge without always
going to a jury bearing. It would depend on the ab crime
that was committed if they had a jury hearing. I bave many
clippings, too many to go over, let me just read you the
heads of some of these that happens in our state. "Warning
signs blew up at side of girl's bed," and this is in
school, ah Kearns. Here's, "Suspect arrested in shooting
at a market." This is in December 28 of last year.
•Police believe two arrested teens belong to dangerous new
cancrr" "Gang fight leaves three stabbed." "Street gang
fires on a family, two die." "Spray painted grafitti," and
this bill covers those acts, that if it's this kind of
destruction of property is committed by two or more people,
there's a penalty for them and they're, it's just something
that we need to adopt to control this. Now in working with
the prosecutors, tbey felt that it was very difficult under
the gang bill to identify these people with the gangs.
8

California, in working with then and talking with them, ah,
wishes that they had developed their law the way we're
developing this one in Utah. It would be such more
enforceable by them* How I might just: show you the volume
here is the California gang law that: they have. So if
there are any questions that I could respond to, I'd be
glad to, Mr. President.
President: of the Senate:
Senator Chuck Peterson?
Senator Chuck Peterson:
Mr. Fordham, ah, Senator Fordham, is this differentiate, is
it the location code a differentiation between juvenile and
other people, I mean, ah, would your bill "apply to
juveniles under eighteen?
Senator Fordham:
It would apply to any crime that was committed by two or
more persons.
Senator Chuck Peterson:
That's what I'm wondering about. I'll have to ask the
legal people on the Senate, the lawyers, whether or not
this is possible for us to pass legislation that would
apply to, that would provide these penalties for a
juvenile. I just don't know whether or not we can do
that. Senator Hillyard?
Senator Hillyard:
My problem when I read that Senator Peterson is the fact
that there's three of us here together and that may
constitute a criminal gang.
Senator Chuck Peterson:
That's for sure. I think it does. Yeah, I, there's no
question about that.
Senator Hillyard:
I would say this. The general law defining juveniles in
that section would override this unless there is a specific
mention of that and I'd have to look at the law. I was not
on the committee when this bill was debated, ah, I had
another conflict that took me out of these bills.
I have
not had a chance to see that but I think that's a
legitimate question that staff who drafted the bill could
answer.
President of the-Senate:
Senator Steel?

9

Senator S t e e l e :
Thank you, Mr. President, I have a question as i t r e l a t e t o
ah, r e l a t e s to a potential in our s t a t e of moving towards
what's termed i n many s t a t e s , "shock incarceration". In
quick summary, as a l i s t i n g , f i r s t time f e l o n s , for
example, ages eighteen through twenty s i x are placed i n
some s t a t e s in a ninety day incarceration boot camp
environment. The recidivism, the impact on those
p a r t i c u l a r individuals in the c i t e s that I noted, I ' v e had
d i s c u s s i o n with, seems to be very e f f e c t i v e and very
appealing and our s t a t e i s looking as p o s s i b l e a l t e r n a t i v e s
t o what we're currently doing. Would these minimum, my
q u e s t i o n , these minimum requirements, ah circumvent that
process?
Senator Pordham:
I don't think that i t would circumvent i t , I think they
would be part of. The judge has the authority to say where
t h e s e i n d i v i d u a l s would be incarcerated or be subjected t o
review or whatever, as I understand i t , the judge would be
able to put these people where they, where he f e l t that i t
would be the most good for them.
P r e s i d e n t of the Senate:
Further questions of Senator Pordham? Senator Cornaby, are
you voting on that o n e . . . I don't see any further questions
then.
U n i d e n t i f i e d speaker:
I move for' the adoption of the b i l l .
P r e s i d e n t of the Senate:
Question has been c a l l e d , for the question s h a l l Senate
B i l l 52 be read for the third time?
[Senators vote o r a l l y ]
Senate B i l l 52 shows twenty f i v e ayes, no nays, four being absent,
the b i l l p a s s e s , to be placed on the third reading calendar.

January 2 4 , 1990
P r e s i d e n t of the Senate:
Senator McCallister?
Senator Pordham —
Personal p w v i l e g e Mr.
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ADDENDUM F
New Utah Sentence and Release Guidelines
(Effective October 15, 1998)

F0RM1
CRIMINAL HISTORY ASSESSMENT
These are guidelines only. They do not create any right or expectation on behalf of the offender.
PRIOR FELONY CONVICTIONS
(SEPARATE CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS)

NONE
ONE
TWO
THREE
MORE THAN THREE

VIOLENCE HISTORY
(PRIOR JUVENILE OR ADULT CONVICTION
FOR AN OFFENSE WHICH INCLUDES USE
OF A WEAPON, PHYSICAL FORCE.
THREAT OF FORCE, OR SEXUAL ABUSE)

0
1
2
3
4

NONE
MISDEMEANOR
3rd DEGREE FELONY
2nd DEGREE FELONY
1st DEGREE FELONY

1
2
3
4
6

CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION
ACTUAL POSSESSION
DISPLAYED OR BRANDISHED
ACTUAL USE
INJURY CAUSED

PRIOR MISDEMEANOR CONVICTIONS
(SEPARATE CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS)
(INCLUDES DUI & RECKLESS)
(EXCLUDES OTHER TRAFFIC)

0
1
2
3
4

NONE
ONE
TWO TO FOUR
FIVE TO SEVEN
MORE THAN SEVEN

WEAPONS USE IN CURRENT OFFENSE
(ONLY WHEN CURRENT CONVICTION
DOES NOT REFLECT WEAPON USE OR
WHEN STATUTORY ENHANCEMENT IS
NOT INVOLVED)

PRIOR JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS
(ADJUDICATIONS FOR OFFENSES THAT
WOULD HAVE BEEN FELONIES IF
COMMITTED BY AN ADULT)(THREE
MISDEMEANOR ADJUDICATIONS EQUAL
ONE FELONY ADJUDICATION)

0
1
2
3
4

NONE
ONE
TWO TO FOUR
MORE THAN FOUR
SECURE PLACEMENT

TOTAL PLACEMENT SCORE:

SUPERVISION HISTORY
(ADULT OR JUVENILE)

0
1
2
3
4

NO PRIOR SUPERVISION
PRIOR SUPERVISION
PRIOR RESIDENTIAL PLACEMENT
PRIOR REVOCATION
ACT OCCURRED WHILE UNDER CURRENT
SUPERVISION OR PRE-TRIAL RELEASE

0
1
2
3
4

NO ESCAPES OR ABSCONDINGS
FAILURE TO REPORT (ACTIVE OFFENSE) OR OUTSTANDING WARRANT
ABSCONDED FROM SUPERVISION
ABSCONDED FROM RESIDENTIAL PROGRAM
ESCAPED FROM CONFINEMENT

SUPERVISION RISK
(ADULT OR JUVENILE)

CRIMINAL HISTORY ROW
V
IV
III
II
1

16 +
12-15
8-11
4-7
0-3
PLEASE CIRCLE THE CORRECT CATEGORY

CRIME CATEGORY
A
I IttOtgrN

CRIMIIMAI. HISTORY

V
IV

C

D

E

F

G

H

i

1st Degree

3rd Degree

1st Degree

2nd Degree

3rd Degree

2nd Degree

3rd Degree

Other

Person

Other

Other
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CONSECUTIVE ENHANCEMENTS: 40% of the shorter sentence is to be added to the full length of the longer sentence.
CONCURRENT ENHANCEMENTS: 10% of the shorter sentence is to be added to the full length of the longer sentence.
Matrix timeframes refer to imprisonment only. Refer to the categorization of offenses.
Capital offenses are not considered within the context of the sentencing guidelines.
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ADDENDUM 6
Order denying defendant's motion challenging
constitutionality of section 76-3-203.1

E. NEAL GUNNARSON
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
CY H. CASTLE, 4808
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 3 63-7900

FILED DISTRICT CflUHT
Third Judicial District

MAY - 11398
UKE COUNTY
°«Puty Cleric

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION CHALLENGING
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION
76-3-203.1

Plaintiff,
-vsJOHN LELEAE,

(f&(
Case No. 9719OB04FS
Defendant,
Hon.
Defendant's
Section

Motion

96-3-203.1

Challenging

came

on

for

Tyrone E. Medley
the

hearing

Constitutionality
before

Tyrone E. Medley on March 9, 1998, at 8:30 a.m.

the

of

Honorable

Cy H. Castle,

Deputy District Attorney, represented plaintiff, State of Utah;
Lisa

J.

Remal

of

the

Salt

Lake

Legal

Defenders

Associations

represented the defendant, John LeLeae, who was present.
Defendant argued at the hearing and in his memorandum that
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 was unconstitutional for the reasons
that it violates defendant's right to a jury trial, due process,
proof beyond a reasonable doubt and equal protection because the
statue

is a separate

offense

which defendant was convicted.

from the underlying

offense

for
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Case No. 97190804FS
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Defendant further argued that the court could not impose the
enhanced penalty because his conduct is governed by two different
statutes

-- conspiracy

and gang

enhancement

-- and

the

state

cannot elect to punish him under the gang enhancement because it
imposes a more severe penalty.
The State responded by arguing that the group enhancement
was constitutional
sentencing

and not a separate offense because it is a

provision

with

the

objective

of

punishing

more

severely those who engage in group criminal activity.
Based upon the arguments of counsel, the memoranda filed by
the parties, consideration of the case law, legislative history
and language of section 76-3-2 03.1, defendant's motion to declare
section 76-3-203.1 unconstitutional is denied for the following
reasons:
1.

Defendant

is not entitled to a jury determination of

whether he has violated

section 76-3-203.1 because

constitutes a separate criminal offense nor defines

it neither
additional

elements for the underlying offense, but instead is a sentencing
provision.
controlled

As such, defendant's conduct
by

two

different

statutes.

in this case
This

is not

conclusion

is

supported by the explicit language of the statute and holding of
State v. Ramirez, 948 P.2d 375 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
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2.

The group enhancement statue does not require a jury to

determine

"in

concert'' mental

culpability,

or

provide

for

penalties in excess of those imposed for the underlying offense.
Therefore, defendant's due process right is not violated by the
trial court's finding facts to support the imposition of the
enhancement by a preponderance of the evidence.
3.

Section

76-3-203.1
arbitrary

or

is

not

void-for-vagueness

discriminatory

and

susceptible

to

enforcement

overbroad.

The statute defines the circumstances in which an

enhancement

is imposed

in terms of a well-established

or

party

liability statute.
4.

Section 76-3-203.1 is not overboard because it does not

prohibit any form of association, other than a group that acts to
commit crime.
5.

Section 76-3-203.1 does not violate defendant's right

to equal protection

or uniform operation of

the

law.

The

statutory classification, clearly identifying those persons whose
sentences should be enhanced, demonstrates a reasonable tendency
to advance the legislative and statutory objective of curtailing
the increased risks of harmful consequences connected with group
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criminal activity.
DATED this

f

day of May, 1998.
COURT:

\,**€SL<

Tyyyne E. Medley
District Court Judge

Approved as to form:

Lisa J. Remal
Attorney for defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I

hereby

foregoing

certify

Order

that

Deny

a

true

and

Defendant's

correct
Motion

copy

of

the

Challenging

Constitutionality of Section 76-3-203.1 was delivered to Lisa J.
Remal, Attorney for Defendant JOHN LELEAE, at 424 East 500 South,
Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah

84111 on the

V ** day of April,

1998.
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